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THE DOMAIN OF CIVIC VIRTUE IN A GOOD
SOCIETY: FAMILIES, SCHOOLS,
AND SEX EQUALITY
Linda C. McClain*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DOMAIN OF CIVIC VIRTUE
The general topic for this panel's discussion, "The Constitution of
Civic Virtue for a Good Society," brings to mind an impossibly large
set of fundamental questions. For example, what role does civic virtue
play in sustaining our constitutional order and what role, if any,
should government play in inculcating civic virtue and, thus, fostering
self-government? What role do the institutions of civil society-a
realm between the individual and the state, including the family and
religious, civic, and other voluntary associations-play? What,
exactly, is the content of civic virtue and what textual sources and
institutional actors determine it? If historical accounts of civic virtue
coexisted with and even lent support to forms of systematic inequality
and subordination such as those rooted in sex and race, then as
constitutional norms of equality change, shouldn't this, in turn,
reshape accounts of civic virtue? And do conceptions of civic virtue
apply primarily to democratic self-government, or public life, or
should they also shape personal self-government, or, to use a
contentious term, private life?
In this article, I will approach this large set of questions by taking
up a subset of related questions, or puzzles, having to do with the
domain of civic virtue in a good society. First, to what does civic
virtue pertain, i.e., to democratic self-government, or also to personal
self-government, or governing the self? Second, in what institutional
domains does a society generate civic virtue and under what
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Faculty Fellow, Harvard
University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. I presented an earlier
draft of this paper in a faculty workshop at New York Law School. Thanks to
participants in that workshop and in the present conference for helpful comments.
Thanks also to Jim Fleming, John DeWitt Gregory, Jill Hasday, and Linda Kerber for
reading a draft, to Amy Baehr, Mary Anne Case and Joanna Grossman for valuable
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conditions may such institutions serve such a role? If in our
constitutional order, important institutions of civil society as well as
governmental institutions serve-or should serve-as "seedbeds of
civic virtue," places or spheres in which the capacities for self-
government are fostered, how does this system of dual, or even
multiple, authority work? I explore this by taking up the respective
roles of families and schools in fostering civic virtue in children. In
the current political climate, there is pervasive rhetoric about the need
to "strengthen families" as a key to national prosperity and well-
being. There is also a sense of an urgent imperative in various social
movements (such as calls to renew civil society) to enhance families'
capacities to serve as first and foremost among the "seedbeds of civic
virtue." Somehow, it is assumed, families matter. And the health of
families is thought to bear a close relationship to the overall moral
and civic health of our nation, just as a weakening of families is
thought to reflect and lead to moral and civic decline and to impose
significant negative externalities on society.1 But why? Is it because
of families' contribution to democratic self-government, to personal
self-government (or "governing the self"), or both?
Third, if, as I argue, sex equality is a core civic virtue and also an
important public value that should inform, to some extent, personal
self-government, then what role should families and schools-as
primary among the "seedbeds of civic virtue"-have in fostering it?
This is one particularly pressing form of the more general question of
how forms of civil society contribute to fostering democratic and
personal self-government and whether, to do so, they must be
congruent with democratic values and forms of governance. Families
are an especially important, though neglected, context in which to ask
about the domain both of civic virtue and of sex equality. A relevant
historical paradox about the idea of families as seedbeds of civic virtue
is that it was possible, from the time of the founding, to assert that
married women fulfilled their civic obligations-and fostered civic
virtue-by serving their husbands and children, even as married
women were denied personal self-government within marriage and all
women were excluded from full participation in democratic self-
government and from conceptions of the virtuous citizen.2 As
feminist scholars have documented, although that legal regime of
family self-governance has been repudiated in many respects by a
regime of formal equality between husbands and wives, its legacy has
1. On the close link between the health of families and national health, and the
problem of negative externalities arising from failing families, I have in mind claims in
some prominent literature calling for a renewal, or revival, of civil society. See infra
Parts I.A and III.A.
2. See Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies (1998) [hereinafter
Kerber, No Constitutional Right]; Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic (1980).
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had lingering effects on family structure and family policy.' Over a
decade ago, Susan Moller Okin pointed out the neglect of the family
in political theories of justice, and asked how families could serve as
schools of citizenship-or, to use more contemporary parlance,
seedbeds of civic virtue-in view of forms of gender-based inequality
and injustice within families Yet the literature about civic virtue
and, particularly, about families as seedbeds of virtue is insufficiently
attentive to this puzzle and to the question of what forms of family
governance contribute to democratic and personal self-governance.
Finally, do families and schools play complementary roles, in
supporting the efforts of each other in fostering such virtues as sex
equality, or ameliorating or compensatory roles, when one or the
other fails to do so? For example, if certain forms of sex inequality
within families exist, but if a commitment to constitutional principles
and prudential considerations must stay government's hand from
coercive regulation within the family, then might schools carry out a
"gentler" form of a formative project of fostering sex equality?
In other articles, I have argued that government should pursue a
formative project to foster the capacities for self-government, both in
the sense of democratic self-government and personal self-
government, and that the institutions of civil society also have a
proper role to play in fostering such capacities.' As a matter of
constitutional interpretation, I believe that our constitutional order
presupposes that citizens possess the capacities for democratic and
personal self-government; its scheme of basic rights and liberties
serves to foster and protect the exercise of such capacities. The
Constitution permits and depends upon, if not authorizes or even
requires, a formative project, even as it places certain limits upon its
pursuit. Similarly, as a matter of political theory, I endorse the
principle that government, in a good society, has an affirmative
responsibility to foster persons' capacities for self-government and,
again, that civil society has an appropriate role to play. Within that
general framework, I take the task of constituting civic virtue to be
fostering persons' capacities for democratic self-government, i.e., to
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and The Family 170-71 (1989)
[hereinafter Okin, Justice]; see infra Part III.B.
5. See Linda C. McClain, Toward a Formative Project of Securing Freedom and
Equality, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1221 (2000); Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming,
Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 301 (2000); Linda
C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives:
Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 19 (1998)
[hereinafter Toleration]. Although Michael Sandel is not the only political theorist to
employ the term "formative project," he helpfully refers to such a project or a
"formative politics" as one that "cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-
government requires." Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent 6,321-24 (1996).
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be good citizens, and I regard that task as an important and proper
component of a formative project.
The first puzzle that I will address in this article concerns the
domain of civic virtue and the relationship between democratic and
personal self-government. Is the task of fostering good citizens
separable from the task of fostering good people,6 or is there an
inevitable spillover from the domain of fostering democratic self-
government to that of fostering personal self-government, or
governing the self?7 I want to propose a seemingly paradoxical
approach to civic virtue: it is important to hold on to the schematic of
two forms of self-government, democratic and personal, even though
it is an uneasy one. There will be unavoidable spillover from fostering
virtues important to democratic life into personal self-government,
and vice versa.' It is, in fact, the problem of spillover and a lack of
containment that animates some of the most difficult problems
concerning the second puzzle noted above: the respective division of
labor between institutions of government and of civil society in
carrying out a formative project.
It is tempting to try to avoid such conflicts by positing a simple
schematic whereby institutions of government foster civic virtue, and,
more broadly, democratic self-government, and institutions of civil
society foster personal virtues and, more broadly, personal self-
government. But, as I illustrate with the example of the dual
authority of families and public schools to foster the self-government
of children, this simple division of labor cannot hold. This is so not
only because of our constitutional order and actual social practice, but
also as a matter of good institutional design. In this article, I argue
6. I am grateful to Steve Schiffrin for bringing up this point in a discussion about
government's formative project.
7. When I use this two-fold distinction, I am drawing upon John Rawls' idea of
persons having two moral powers, one pertaining to democratic self-government, or
the capacity for a conception of justice and one to personal self-government, or the
capacity for a conception of the good. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 19 (1993)
[hereinafter Rawls, Political Liberalism]. I believe that this is a useful schematic, but
that, in light of cogent feminist critique of political liberalism, a more adequate
conception of moral powers would add to this schematic a moral power pertaining to
the capacity to form and participate in human relationships, participate in civil
society, and to give and receive care. See Eva Fedar Kittay, Love's Labor (1999);
Okin, Justice, supra note 4, at 106-08.
8. In the text, I am most concerned that blurring any distinction would seem to
require too much congruence between government and civil society. Another reason
for holding onto this distinction, which I will not explore here, is that affording a place
for personal self-government emphasizes the importance of personal autonomy and
may ward off attempts to disavow it or subsume it under democratic self-government.
Of course, autonomy is relevant to both forms of self-government, but some accounts
of self-government (e.g., Michael Sandel's in Sandel, supra note 5) seem to devalue
autonomy in the domain of personal self-government. For elaboration, see James E.
Fleming and Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Texas L. Rev.
509 (1997) (book review) (discussing Sandel's civic republicanism).
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that, in a good society, families (ideally) will play a role in cultivating
civic virtue (and democratic self-government), but they also will play
an indispensable role in fostering other forms of virtue and contribute
vitally to personal self-government. Families provide necessary
caregiving that nurtures human development and fosters human
capital. Whether or not there are children in a family, families allow
persons to realize goods of intimate association. To be sure, some or
even many of these contributions to personal self-government may
have the spillover effect of fostering civic virtue as well. Similarly, in
a good society, schools properly aim to foster children's capacities for
democratic and personal self-government by preparing them for good
citizenship and for good, successful lives.
Thus, the idea of families as "seedbeds of civic virtue"-as well as
of virtues generally-helpfully connotes that families, in a good
society, serve as places or sources of growth and development of
capacities and virtues.9 But taking the rhetoric about families as
seedbeds of civic virtue seriously invites careful attention to the
questions noted above concerning how families foster capacities for
self-government and under what circumstances families are able to do
so. Too often, prescriptions for fortifying families as seedbeds of
virtue focus primarily on shoring up one form of the family, the two-
parent, marital (heterosexual) family, 0 and fail to consider the
possible relevance to the capacity of families to generate self-
government of such matters as forms of family self-governance, what
values parents teach their children, and how they socialize them.
Should the norms of institutions of civil society, such as families, be
"congruent" with public norms and institutions "all the way down," so
that "the membership and internal organization of associations should
be a matter of public policy, legally enforced"?" If families are not
congruent in this way, and do not explicitly mirror or generate
democratic values, could they be said to be "seedbeds of virtue" if
9. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1062 (1987) (defining seedbed
as "(2) a place or source of growth or development").
10. See, eg., Council on Civil Society, A Call to Civil Society: Why Democracy
Needs Moral Truths 18 (1998) [hereinafter A Call to Civil Society]; Nat'l Comm'n on
Civic Renewal, A Nation of Spectators: How Civic Disengagement Weakens America
and What We Can Do About It 13 (1998) [hereinafter A Nation of Spectators]. As I
have explained my approach elsewhere, I support a more pluralistic approach to
family policy, which would focus less on form and more on family dynamics and how
to help different kinds of families serve the important functions they have in our
constitutional democracy. Also, feminist work on family form and on gender roles
within families has offered good reasons to be skeptical about appeals to preserving
traditional families. Finally, whether families have the resources to fulfill their
responsibilities depends upon baseline questions of what level of governmental and
societal support for families exists. See McClain & Fleming, supra note 5, at 335 n.166
and accompanying text.
11. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals 4 (1998) (defining
"congruence"). Rosenblum's excellent book does not address congruence in the
context of families.
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they play a "mediating" role in indirectly supporting those values by
fostering in persons a "whole range of moral dispositions,
presumptively supportive of political order"?12
In this article, I urge greater attention to sex equality as a core
element in a conception of civic virtue in a good society and to the
implications of taking sex equality seriously for a formative project.
To be sure, "equality" commonly appears as part of a core set of civic
virtues and public values, yet sex equality receives insufficient
attention.13 In the United States, the content of this virtue of sex
equality may be gleaned from federal constitutional and statutory
norms, state and local anti-discrimination law, transformations in the
law of domestic relations (e.g., the gradual repudiation of the law of
coverture), contemporary principles of political morality, and perhaps
even from cultural consensus. Sex equality is not only a civic virtue-
one that should guide how government treats female and male citizens
and how citizens treat and regard each other-but also is (or should
be) a virtue of everyday life, a principle of political morality that
should inform and regulate forms of personal self-government.
The critical question, of course, is just how deeply that virtue should
structure everyday life and how competing political principles,
constitutional rights, and prudential concerns may temper that reach.
I will offer a somewhat contradictory set of responses to this puzzle of
congruence. First, although the mere discussion of congruence
between family values and democratic values is likely to trigger an
initial fear of a complete violation of any boundary between private
and public life, this immediate reaction ignores that the norm of sex
equality already shapes family life to a significant degree and rules out
the legally-sanctioned, patriarchal family of an earlier era. Thus, a
simple schematic that would relegate sex equality to public life and
exempt private life does not hold.
Second, even though sex equality is a core constitutional and public
value, this value and its proper application are controversial, even as it
touches on more public aspects of daily life, for example, sexual
harassment law. The controversy is even sharper, and the range of
consensus narrower, when the issue is its proper application to family
self-governance and family life (e.g., the division of authority and of
market and caregiving labor within marriage) and to how to educate
children about gender roles. Indeed, even though Okin forcefully
presses the claim that families cannot serve as sites for nurturing civic
virtue if they do not comport with principles of sex equality in their
norms of family governance and in socialization of children, she also
12. Id. at 41. Rosenblum notes that this is a "more capacious approach to the
moral uses of association than the logic of congruence," because "[t]he business of
instilling habits of responsibility, reciprocity, cooperation, or trust is compatible with a
variety of political orientations and substantive values." Id. at 42.
13. See infra Part II.B and IV.B.2.
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has argued that, given the lack of cultural consensus about proper
gender roles within families, liberal principles and prudential
considerations preclude government from compelling families to
become egalitarian.14 Here, one dimension of the problem is that
constitutional norms of equal protection require that government
honor sex equality as a "sovereign" virtue,' - in the sense that when
government regulates, it may not use sex-based classifications without
an "exceedingly persuasive justification."' 6 Especially relevant here, it
may not merely replicate ancient stereotypes about gender-based
roles for women and men in families, workplace, and elsewhere. This,
in turn, shapes family roles and responsibilities: it precludes states
from requiring or supporting a patriarchal form of family governance.
But it does not rule out either families constituting themselves in ways
that reinforce traditional gender roles or parents seeking to ingrain
those roles in their children. The most acute form of such adherence
to traditional roles may be religious fundamentalist households, which
follow a form of family self-governance of male authority and female
submission with supposed scriptural roots, but such role division also
exists in the many households in which women continue to bear
disproportionate responsibility for domestic and caretaking labor.
There are significant constitutional principles and prudential
considerations that argue against an insistence that families organize
themselves according to a robust vision of sex equality. But this does
not rule out government carrying out a formative project to promote
sex equality by a wide range of measures that fall short of coercion.
Such forms of governmental action could encourage sex equality
within families and also inculcate in children norms of sex equality in
sites outside of the family. For example, I believe that schools have an
appropriate role to play in inculcating sex equality, particularly if
families fail to do so, even though some families perceive this as a
threat to their ability to foster their own conceptions of virtue. I offer
some preliminary thoughts about how fostering sex equality should be
a proper component of already-existing curricular tasks such as civic
education and character education and I advocate that schools should
incorporate into their curriculum gender education (by which I mean
education to counter sex role stereotyping and the harms it imposes
on both girls and boys). The contemporary challenge is both to affirm
and support the important role of families in fostering the capacities
14. See Okin, Justice, supra note 4, at 16-21,74-85; infra Part III.B.2.
15. I am borrowing the idea of "sovereign virtue" from Ronald Dworkin's recent
book, Sovereign Virtue, in which he argues that equality, in the form of -equal
concern" on the part of government for all its citizens, is the "sovereign virtue" of
political community, without which government is not legitimate. See Ronald
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 1-2 (2000).
Dworkin's subject is not sex equality, but material equality, or equality of resources.
16. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)).
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for self-government and in cultivating civic and personal virtues and
to affirm and support principles of sex equality and liberty. This latter
commitment requires the repudiation of a legally-supported model of
family governance that denies or hinders women's responsible self-
government and invites careful examination of how gender ideology
prescribes family roles.
In Part II, I raise the issue of spillover between democratic and
personal self-government, and the virtues of good citizens and good
persons, by exploring three distinct approaches to the domain of civic
virtue. I argue that sex equality is a core, though neglected, civic
virtue and consider some of the problems of spillover raised by
examining the domain of that virtue. I pose questions concerning the
appropriate domain of sex equality within families. In Part III, I
examine the role of families in contributing to self-government. I
address the issue of spillover by looking at current political concern to
strengthen families as "seedbeds of civic virtue." I discuss how to
address two forms of sex inequality within families: the gendered
division of authority and labor in many American households and the
more acute form of this division in religious fundamentalist
households. In Part IV, I discuss the dual authority, under our
constitutional order, of families and schools to foster civic virtue, as
well as other forms of virtue, in children, illustrating the impossibility
of a simple schematic that would neatly divide the labor between
government and civil society for carrying out a formative project. I
then explore the role of public schools in promoting sex equality and
ameliorating forms of sex inequality within families.
II. PLACING SEX EQUALITY IN THE DOMAIN OF CIVIC VIRTUE:
THE PROBLEM OF SPILLOVER
A. Defining Civic Virtue and its Role in Self-Government:
Three Approaches
What is civic virtue? What is its relationship to self-government?
One useful definition of civic virtue is that it encompasses the set of
qualities of character, skills, and dispositions that are necessary for
democratic self-government. 17 Put in a slightly different way, civic
virtue is among the "preconditions of active citizenship," and "the
capacities and dispositions conducive to thoughtful participation in
the activities of modern politics and civil society." 8 Contrasting the
first definition, offered by civic republican theorist Michael Sandel,
and the more expansive second definition, offered by civic liberal
theorist Stephen Macedo, suggests the problem of spillover and
17. Sandel, supra note 5, at 25 (republican theory "seeks ... to cultivate in citizens
the qualities of character necessary to the common good of self-government.").
18. Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust 10 (2000).
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containment, since participation in civil society would seem to
embrace important dimensions of personal, as well as democratic, self-
government. In either case, if virtue (etymologically) connotes
excellence, then civic virtue connotes excellence in carrying out a
particular role: the role of citizen.' 9 Civic education, then, should
focus upon "developing the knowledge, understandings, and
intellectual and participatory skills necessary for competent and
responsible citizenship in our constitutional democracy."2-
It may be helpful to think about the domain of civic virtue and the
spillover between democratic and personal self-government by
considering three contrasting positions: (1) civic virtues are distinct
from personal virtues; (2) the virtues of the good person closely
overlap with the virtues needed to be a good citizen, so that learning
to govern the self is indispensable to democratic self-government; and
(3) the virtues of a good citizen closely overlap with the virtues
needed to be a good person, so that persons should evaluate their
personal lives and commitments in light of key civic virtues. What
role, on each of these approaches, does a formative project play in
fostering democratic and personal self-government? After canvassing
these approaches, I will then focus more explicitly upon sex equality
as a core component of civic virtue.
The first position is one of discontinuity, or a lack of congruence:
there is a distinct set of virtues identifiable as civic or political virtues,
which characterize the ideal of a good citizen of a democratic state,
and these must be distinguished from the virtues that characterize the
ideal of the good person-virtues that characterize "ways of life"
belonging to persons' comprehensive and philosophical doctrines, as
well as the virtues related to forms of associational life, such as
families and other forms of civil society. Political liberalism, as
elaborated by John Rawls, takes this view. His conception of justice
may affirm the superiority of "the virtues of fair social cooperation
such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the
sense of fairness," and government appropriately promotes and
strengthens public virtues, such as toleration, anti-discrimination, and
mutual trust 1 But it should not advance a comprehensive ideal of the
virtues of a good person.22 Political liberalism's distinction between
political and personal virtues seems to offer some barrier against
spillover.' Political liberalism's conception of a set of civic virtues, or
19. Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues 13 (1997).
20. The Role of Civic Education: A Report of the Task Force on Civic Education
(Center for Civic Education, prepared for Second Annual White House Conference
on Character Building for a Democratic, Civil Society, May 19-20, 1995) [hereinafter
The Role of Civic Education].
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 194-95.
22 Id
23. See id. at 194. Even though William Galston's account of liberal virtues
articulates a closer relationship between the good citizen and the good person than
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skills, distinct from virtues applicable to personal, or private life, finds
echoes in prominent accounts of the proper aims of civic education.24
But the discontinuity approach does not mean that there is no
relationship between the good person and the good citizen, nor does it
mean that government has no affirmative responsibility to foster
personal self-government. Political liberalism recognizes a proper role
for government in helping to develop both moral powers (the capacity
for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good)
and to provide the goods necessary for such development.25 Further,
it regards the institutions of civil society as a "fund of implicitly shared
ideas and principles" that make a shared political conception
possible. 6 Civil society also affords communities in which persons
may develop and experience the vital good of self-respect, which is the
good most important for human development.27 Families, as part of
the "basic structure" of society, have the important task of ensuring
the "nurturing and development" of children, who, as citizens, must
"have a sense of justice and the political virtues that support political
and social institutions."'  In this regard, political liberalism expects
that families and other institutions of civil society are, in a significant
sense, seedbeds of virtue and will generate support for political
principles, public values, and such civic virtues as reciprocity. 29
The second position assumes that there is an important continuity,
or congruence, between the virtues of the good person and the good
citizen: virtues important for personal self-government, or governing
the self, are also important for- and form the foundation for-
democratic self-government. The most vivid contemporary example
does Rawls, Galston wishes to hold onto a distinction between a "limited conception
of liberal public purposes"-i.e., of the appropriate domain of civic ends-and a more
robust account of liberal virtues that would threaten world views or ways of life that
reject key liberal ideals, such as critical reflection. William A. Galston, Liberal
Purposes 153-54 (1991).
24. See Center for Civic Education, et al., CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic
Education (1991) [hereinafter CIVITAS] (noting that "civic virtue is distinct from
those virtues that are relevant to private or personal lives").
25. In Political Liberalism, Rawls uses a set of primary social goods, which
includes rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, to express
the things citizens need to be free and equal persons. This list then serves as a source
of appropriate claims by citizens and allows citizens the means to advance their
conceptions of the good. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 187. Here, as
with moral powers, I believe that Rawls' account of primary goods is a helpful way to
begin thinking about government's formative project, but some additions to this list
are needed: for example, the caretaking necessary to foster human capacity for
responsible self-government, connection, and community, and the freedom from
violence and exploitation. See Kittay, supra note 7; Okin, Justice, supra note 4.
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 14.
27. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 440-42 (1971).
28. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 788
(1997) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited].
29. Rosenblum refers to this assumption about the effects of associational life as
Rawls' "liberal expectancy." Rosenblum, supra note 11, at 51-53.
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of this position may be found in some of the contemporary calls to
revive, or renew, civil society. There is a close relationship, in much of
the civil society literature, between the good person and the good
citizen. Proponents of renewing civil society take as their canonical
text Federalist No. 55, in which James Madison first observes that
"there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust," but then acknowledges that
there are "other qualities in human nature which justify a certain
portion of esteem and confidence" and that "republican government
presupposes the existence of those qualities in a higher degree than
any other form."'  The civil society thesis is that the Founders
assumed that the institutions of civil society would be the primary
"seedbeds of civic virtue," or "foundational sources of competence,
character, and citizenship."'" The challenge today is to help civil
society carry out its "essential social task": "to foster competence and
character in individuals, build social trust, and help children become
good people and good citizens. 32  But both government and civil
society play a role in this formative project: "the basic purpose of
government-and all other institutions-is to help foster the
conditions for human flourishing," and "democratic civil society,
anchored in moral truth," provides these "essential conditions for
human flourishing. 3
There is a close affinity between virtues important to democratic
self-government and those important to personal self-government
because self-government begins with "governing the self," a task
taught especially well by families. For example, one report, A Call to
Civil Society, characterizes the family as first among the seedbeds of
virtue and the "cradle of citizenship," because there a child learns
"the essential qualities necessary for governing the self: honesty,
trust, loyalty, cooperation, self-restraint, civility, compassion, personal
responsibility, and respect for others."'' Families are at the heart of
30. The Federalist No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rosssiter ed., 1961);
A Call to Civil Society, supra note 10, at 7 (quoting Federalist No. 55); see also Mary
Ann Glendon, Rights Talk 116 (1991) (quoting and discussing Federalist No. 55).
31. A Call to Civil Society, supra note 10, at 7.
32- Id. at 6. However, even though they extol non-governmental institutions such
as families and religious institutions as "seedbeds," revivalists generally advocate that
such institutions as schools engage in civic education and recognize local government
as an important potential seedbed.
33. A Call to Civil Society, supra note 10, at 16. This is, to be sure, a fairly thick
account of civic virtue, one that insists upon a foundation for democracy in a "public
moral philosophy" of "a larger set of shared ideas about human virtue and the
common good," moral truths, that are "in large part biblical and religious" and that
make self-governance possible. Id. at 12-14. Elsewhere, I critique this thick account
and argue that an approach more akin to political liberalism is better suited to a
constitutional democracy characterized by reasonable moral pluralism. McClain &
Fleming, supra note 5, at 322-26.
34. A Call to Civil Society, supra note 10, at 7; see also Seedbeds of Virtue:
Sources of Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society (Mary Ann
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the agenda for renewal: a core goal for "moral renewal" of
democracy is stemming the "steady break-up of the married couple
child-raising unit," which is viewed as the "leading propeller of our
overall social deterioration."'35
This mixing of the good person and good citizen continues in the
account of the values that religious institutions3 6 and schools37 should
teach. It is not until one gets to the virtues taught by participation in
local government that one finds a set of civic virtues that are more
obviously political, or, as A Call to Civil Society puts it, which teach
"the particular skills of citizenship: deliberation, compromise,
consensus building, and reason giving. "38
If one theme characterizes the account of civic virtue as it appears
in this kind of civil society literature, it is that one cannot readily
separate matters of personal morality from political morality, or civic
renewal from moral renewal. Hence, the "rejection of legitimate
authority" is primary evidence of "increasingly uncivil ... behavior,"
as are "[c]hildren disrespecting adults" and "[n]eighbors not being
neighborly."39 But even the strand of the civil society literature that
focuses more on civic renewal links civic life to "moral ecology" and
"government of the self' to "self-government," contending that the
defense of liberty requires "more than the pursuit of happiness; it
requires the modest but vital virtues of loving parents, faithful
spouses, good neighbors, law-abiding citizens, and sober patriots."40
Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) [hereinafter Seedbeds of Virtue] (linking
fate of American democracy to health of families as "seedbeds of virtue").
35. A Call To Civil Society, supra note 10, at 18; see also Seedbeds of Virtue,
supra note 34, at 3 ("[T]he simultaneous weakening of child-raising families and their
surrounding and supporting institutions constitutes our culture's most serious long-
term problem.").
36. Religious institutions "foster values that are essential to human flourishing
and to democratic civil society: personal responsibility, respect for moral law, and
neighbor-love, or concern for others." A Call To Civil Society, supra note 10, at 8.
37. In a "self-governing" society, schools are to teach "basic standards of good
conduct: personal responsibility, respect for teachers' authority, and respect for other
students." Id. at 10. There is, under the rubric of teaching "civic literacy," a
component that seems less obviously tied to personal self-government: students are to
be taught "knowledge of their country's constitutional heritage, respect for the lives
of national heroes, including great dissidents, a comprehension of what good
citizenship is, and an appreciation of their society's civic and moral ideals." Id.; see
also A Nation of Spectators, supra note 10, at 14 (advocating that schools should
reorganize their internal life to "reinforce basic civic virtues such as personal and
social responsibility" and instruct in civic knowledge and skills and encourage
community work).
38. A Call To Civil Society, supra note 10, at 10.
39. Id. at 5.
40. A Nation of Spectators, supra note 10, at 6-7, 12. The passage continues: "We
need tolerance and commitment; and especially in moments of challenge, we need the
capacity for sacrifice." Id. at 12. A variant on the civil society thesis is that political
liberalism, if it is to honor its respect for reasonable moral pluralism, requires a
modest governmental agenda, one that leaves the inculcation of civic virtue to the
institutions of civil society because any governmental attempt directly to foster civic
1628 [Vol. 69
2001] FAMILIES, SCHOOLS AND SEX EQUALITY
Finally, a third position echoes the second (i.e., the civil society
approach) in seeing continuity between the democratic and personal
virtues, but here the direction of influence runs the other way: the
virtues important for liberal democratic self-government are also
those that make possible-and should inform-governing of the self,
or personal self-government. Moreover, liberal principles should
serve as a critical benchmark against which to evaluate all of our life
projects and relationships. An excellent example of this position is
Stephen Macedo's book, Liberal Virtues, which strongly argues that
liberalism's public virtues inevitably wil and appropriately should
spill over into the realm of personal self-government, or private life."'
In his more recent book, Diversity and Distrust, Macedo advances an
ambitious account of liberalism's legitimate civic ends and claims an
expansive domain for liberal civic virtue, which he characterizes as
"civic liberalism.142 The best and bluntest articulation of this strategy
of continuity or "congruence" is his account of the demands of the
core liberal virtue of critical self-reflection:
The fact is that a broad (not comprehensive) commitment to critical
thinking is inseparable from the core civic capacities of good liberal
citizens. Liberal citizens should be committed to honoring the
public demands of liberal justice in all departments of their lives.
They should be alert to the possibility that religious imperatives, or
even inherited notions of what it means to be a good parent, spouse,
or lover, might in fact run afoul of guarantees of equal freedom. A
basic aim of civic education should be to impart to all children the
ability to reflect critically on their personal and public commitments
for the sake of honoring our shared principles of liberal justice and
equal rights for all. Only in this way can citizens reassure
themselves and their fellow citizens that they are alert to possible
conflict among their nonpublic imperatives and commitments and
the demands of liberal public reasonableness.43
Beyond this demand made on liberal citizens, civic liberalism also
advocates that our liberal constitutional order permits a statecraft that
attempts to shape and educate citizens and the institutions of civil
virtue would be an inappropriate imposition of a public orthodoxy that would destroy
genuine pluralism and diversity. Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 453,455-56,469 (2000).
41. To highlight just a few of the numerous articulations of this idea in Macedo's
book, see, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues 265 (1990) ("[P]ublic values
penetrate and partly constitute private relations .... Liberal political norms have a
private life: they help shape and structure the private lives of liberal citizens. To a
greater extent than liberals usually allow, freedom is a way of life."); id. at 272 (-The
same virtues that contribute to individual flourishing in pluralistic liberal communities
also contribute to the performance of liberal civic duties, the liberal virtues are both
civic and personal virtues.").
42. Macedo, supra note 18, at 8-12.
43. Id. at 239.
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society in ways that support free self-government and liberal
citizenship.'
Giving content to the demands of liberal public reasonableness and
liberal justice, Macedo refers to a shared "public" or "political"
morality that would include "national ideals of liberty and equality" as
"supreme" civic ideals informing the Constitution.4 5 (Although I
assume that Macedo would readily include sex equality as a
component of such virtues, it does not make an explicit appearance in
his account.) Other virtues relate to the demands of public
reasonableness, e.g., (1) reciprocity, or seeking to discern and abide by
the fair terms of cooperation and (2) willingness to acknowledge the
fact of reasonable pluralism, which requires such virtues as
"toleration, openness, self-criticism, and mutual respect."46 It is also
clear from the passage quoted above that the capacity for critical
reflection is a core virtue.
None of the three accounts considered above envisions a sharp line
demarcating personal and democratic self-government, particularly as
they consider the role of families. Even the discontinuity approach, as
exemplified by political liberalism, assumes that important sites of
personal self-government, such as families, will nurture and support
civic virtue and democratic self-government. Indeed, Okin's well-
known feminist criticism of Rawls' initial account of families for
assuming- without taking steps to ensure-that families are just has
required political liberalism to face the issue of how families can serve
as seedbeds of virtue if they harbor injustice and inequality and what
permissible measures government might use to foster sex equality
within families.47
While both the civil society thesis and the civic liberal approach
posit a continuity between civic virtue and personal virtue, there is a
possibly sharp point of tension with respect to the content of civic
virtue. This tension point is one of considerable relevance to the role
of families and to the domain of sex equality. The civil society thesis
often notes women's historic role within families as transmitters of
civic virtue; yet calls to strengthen families rarely examine the
problem of inequality within families.4" The civil society model of
continuity stresses that learning respect for authority and cherishing
tradition help to form good persons and good citizens. By contrast,
for Macedo's civic liberalism, critical reflection upon tradition,
inherited roles, and, indeed, all one's personal commitments-such as
44. Id. at 10-11.
45. Id. at 144, 168.
46. Id. at 233.
47. See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, at 788-94; see also infra text
accompanying notes 106-13, 119-32.
48. This is a point that I have discussed elsewhere. See McClain & Fleming, supra
note 5, at 329-30.
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that of spouse or parent-is a core civic capacity that bears on
personal self-government. And while the civil society literature
generally views schools as reinforcing the moral lessons taught at
home, civic liberalism recognizes that there may be a sharp,
unavoidable tension between parental authority to shape children and
the authority of public schools to treat children as "independent
persons-in-the-making with their own basic interests and their own
lives to lead."49  The tension between the virtue of respecting
authority and tradition and the virtue of critical reflection upon
tradition is of key importance to a consideration of the civic virtue of
sex equality and of the role of families and schools in promoting it.
B. Sex Equality as a Core Component of Civic Virtue
I have suggested that civic virtue is usefully understood as the set of
skills, dispositions, and traits of character conducive to democratic
self-government and that a proper component of a formative project
is to foster democratic self-government. In seeking to articulate a
"core" set of principles, virtues and values that exemplify and
undergird our constitutional democracy, scholars and proponents of
civic education look to fundamental texts such as the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, and to historical
understandings.' "Equality" is among that core set of virtues, but sex
equality often receives insufficient attention."1 It may be subsumed
under the virtue of "respect for the rights of others.". And it is
implicitly at stake, for example, in the debate over whether the
capacity for critical reflection is a core virtue that should be inculcated
in children.
It would be better to state explicitly that a commitment to
antisubordination and to women's equal citizenship is a core public
49. Macedo, supra note 18, at 233.
50. See, e.g., The Role of Civic Education, supra note 20, at 4, 8; CIVITAS, supra
note 24, at 3-8; Rosemary C. Salomone, Visions of Schooling 228-34 (2000);
Symposium: Civics Education and America's Founding Documents, 175 J. Educ. 5-129(1993) (addressing themes pertaining to the work and mission of The National Center
for America's Founding Documents, whose primary aim is to promote education in
the schools by encouraging "civic literacy").
51. One illustrative example, discussed in text infra, is CIVITAS, supra note 24.
See also Fostering Civic Virtue: Character Education in the Social Studies, Soc. Stud.
Rev., Fall/Winter 1997, at 23 (position statement of the National Council for the
Social Studies). This position statement by NCSS mentions "equality" (once) as a
fundamental value, notes that teachers' position should be that "while there have
been failures in our nation's attempt to live according to democratic ideals, there is a
common tradition worth transmitting to the next generation," but makes no explicit
reference to the idea of dissident citizenship or how that struggle might be part of
civic virtue. Id at 25. Stephen Macedo's otherwise excellent book, Liberal Virtues,
supra note 41, has little explicit discussion of sex equality. One notable
counterexample is Toni Marie Massaro, Constitutional Literacy: A Core Curriculum
for a Multicultural Nation 116-21, 128-53 (1993).
52. See, eg., Macedo, supra note 41, at 259; Dagger, supra note 19, at 196.
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value and civic virtue. Moreover, the story of the emergence of sex
equality as a constitutional and political norm is a complex one of
subordination and emancipation. 3 It includes the initial exclusion of
all women (free or enslaved) from equal citizenship and the relegation
of women within marriage to coverture, a system of family governance
under which women were under various legal disabilities excluding
them from participation in the economic, civic, and political spheres
and in which men had authority over women's bodies, property, and
freedom of movement. Alongside the legal regime of coverture were
ideologies about gender roles that legitimized women's exclusion from
equal citizenship. As Linda Kerber's work on the ideology of
republican motherhood reveals, women fulfilled their obligations to
the state-and thus contributed to civic virtue-through service to
their husbands and children.' The story of "We the People" is both
one of exclusion and one of the gradual inclusion of the excluded,
along with the gradual extension of (most of) the obligations of
citizenship to women. This story is one of "dissident" citizenship56
and of women claiming rights and equal status based on a core set of
national commitments, as was done, for example at the Seneca Falls
Convention. Thus, a full account of the emergence of sex equality as a
civic virtue would include this history of dissident citizenship, as in the
abolitionist and suffrage movements, and of the critical
transformation of women's legal and social status in light of reflection
upon the demands of those national commitments, as well as
reconstruction of those national commitments, as illustrated by the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Moreover, feminists
identified and contested women's unequal status and men's unjust
power within the family as a principal site of women's legally-
sanctioned subordination. 7
53. See Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment:
Reasoning about "the Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in
History, Memory, and the Law 131 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
54. Kerber, No Constitutional Right, supra note 2, at 8-11.
55. Id. at 161-85 (discussing Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), where the
Supreme Court upheld women's exclusion from jury service because of their "special
responsibilities" for home life). The use of the modified "most" in the text refers to
women's exclusion from registration for the military draft (Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57 (1981)), although women are actively enrolled in all branches of military
service.
56. See Holloway Sparks, Dissident Citizenship: Democratic Theory, Political
Courage, and Activist Women, 12 Hypatia, Fall 1997, at 74, 75 ("Dissident
citizenship.., encompasses the often creative oppositional practices of citizens who,
either by choice or (much more commonly) by forced exclusion from the
institutionalized means of opposition, contest current arrangements of power from
the margins of the polity.").
57. See David A.J. Richards, Women, Gays, and the Constitution 224-33 (1998);
Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal. L.
Rev. 1373 (2000); Siegel, supra note 53.
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Why, then, isn't sex equality more readily recognized as part of the
core of civic virtue? And why do some of those accounts that do
mention sex equality express such ambivalence about it? One leading
text, CIVITAS: A Framework for Civic Education, illustrates this
ambivalence. On the one hand, its "Civic Knowledge and Skills"
section (intended to offer to educators "summaries, by specialists in
their respective fields, of what the specialists believe people should
ideally know in order to be effective as citizens"5s) includes a section
on "Gender Issues."59 It does note women's exclusion from formal
political life, offers a historical account of first and second wave
feminism, of how beliefs about different male and female natures
were thought to justify different roles, and mentions a number of
contemporary problems women face, such as work/family conflict,
wage inequality, and job segregation.' On the other hand, this
account gives scant attention to coverture and women's lack of
autonomy and bodily integrity within marriage, and how those
conditions motivated feminist efforts.6 Moreover, it erases the
important role of feminist struggle against second class citizenship
with such questionable assertions as: "most changes in the status of
women can be traced to social and economic changes not directly
attributable to political action specifically aimed at the betterment of
women's conditions" (such as the influx of women into the
workforce). 2 And although this is to be a guide for what sorts of
knowledge citizens ought to have, its approach is not to affirm a
commitment to sex equality, after this history of subordination, is a
core part of contemporary civic understandings, but instead to offer a
quite equivocal stance toward sex equality. It notes many unresolved
"gender issues" as "open political questions," due to "underlying
disagreements about deeply held values, especially views about the
proper roles for women and men in society."' Thus, on the one hand,
"most Americans recognize questions of fairness in the treatment of
both women and men as an important part of their values," but, on
the other, "[mlany Americans are wary of the fundamental changes in
institutions that are demanded by advocates who wish to provide men
and women with complete equality in every sphere of life."'
Why don't discussions of the aims of civic education more
frequently refer to this history of women's exclusion and gradual
emancipation? Is such an equivocal or ambivalent stance toward sex
58. CIVITAS, supra note 24, at 93. Christina Hoff Sommers, author of the
controversial book Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women
(1994), is identified as an author of this section of CIVITAS. Id. at x.
59. Id. at 258-77.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 262 (discussing briefly coverture and domestic violence).
62 Id. at 258.
63. Id at 273.
64. Id. at 276.
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equality, as a core component of civic virtue, warranted? If not, and I
believe it is not, what accounts for such ambivalence? Reva Siegel has
recently argued that while the story of race discrimination recognizes
a history of racial wrongdoing and a constitutional commitment to
transcend it, discourse about sex equality generally lacks a story that is
"structurally homologous" to the race discrimination narrative, one
that recognizes the role of coercive state power in maintaining
women's second-class citizenship.65 She attributes this to a forgetting
of what was at stake in the "protracted struggle over 'the woman
question' (culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, removing
constitutional impediments to women's right to vote): in significant
part, it was conflicts over women's status within the family. Instead,
she argues, the discourse about women's equality more readily
attributes the change in women's legal rights and responsibilities to
discarding archaic attitudes about the sexes.66
Nonetheless, Siegel interprets the recent Supreme Court decision
concerning the Virginia Military Institute as invoking "a history of
constitutional wrongs to demonstrate why the nation has a deep moral
obligation to protect women's constitutional rights."'67 I would also
argue that, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in striking down the
husband notification provision of an abortion statute, the Court made
clear that our constitutional order cannot permit states to allow
households to reinstate coverture; for principles of individual liberty
and equality directly conflict with patriarchy as a mode of family and
societal governance.' Similarly, one could view the Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA") as a national legislative repudiation of
coverture, and its vestigial remains in state law, and an attempt to
affirm that protecting women from forms of family governance that
include violence against them is a matter of appropriate national
political concern (warranting a combined federal-state effort). 69
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's closely divided opinion striking
down the Civil Rights Remedy of VAWA failed to accept the link
between violence against women and their status as equal citizens
under the federal Constitution, under the guise of distinguishing what
65. Siegel, supra note 53, at 131-32.
66. Id. at 181-82; 173-74.
67. Id. at 178 (discussing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
68. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833-98 (1992) (stating that
contemporary constitutional norms of individual liberty and privacy preclude
husbands from exercising the kind of control over wives that characterized earlier
understandings of marriage). Thus, Linda Kerber invokes the Court's repudiation of
the patriarchal marriage relation in Casey as "the moment when coverture, as a living
legal principle, died." Kerber, No Constitutional Right, supra note 2, at 307; see also
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (striking down Louisiana community
property law treating husband as "head and master" of property jointly owned with
wife).
69. Violence Against Women Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994).
1634 [Vol. 69
2001] FAMILIES, SCHOOLS AND SEX EQUALITY
is "truly national" (hence, constitutional) and "truly local"
(preventing and remedying crime). 0
In sum, sex equality should be within the core of principles, virtues,
and values that may be said to reflect a national consensus. This is not
to deny that there are contemporary conflicts over the meaning of the
constitutional and societal commitment to equality, as well as over the
scope of sex equality as a civic virtue. Indeed, as Toni Massaro
usefully argues, an important component of "constitutional literacy"
should include not only teaching about the history of "excluding
people on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, and gender," but also
should include teaching about contemporary conflicts over what
"abstract constitutional principles" such as equality mean in practice.7! '
The content of that civic virtue is gleaned from federal
constitutional and statutory norms, transformations in the law of
domestic relations (e.g., the gradual repudiation of the law of
coverture), contemporary principles of public morality, and, to some
extent, cultural consensus.12 (Admittedly, civil rights laws forbidding
sex discrimination may not have been motivated by a desire to
inculcate civic virtue, but rather by a desire to prevent the harm of
discrimination and to further the principle of equal opportunity. Yet it
seems reasonable to say that such laws promote a disposition not to
discriminate and teach that good citizens do not discriminate in a
specified range of dealings with others.)
If sex equality is a civic virtue, then it is appropriate for government
to promote it. Promoting that virtue should include cultivating certain
skills, dispositions, and attitudes, such as the idea that one's sex is
irrelevant to one's ability to contribute to society, as well as promoting
certain substantive norms or ends, such as equal opportunity, anti-
subordination, and the repudiation of coverture and a caste system
based on sex. Given the central role of education through common
schools in forming citizens, it follows that educational institutions
should be major actors in fostering civic virtue.
70. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000).
71. Massaro, supra note 51, at 140-41. I view Massaro's approach as different
from that of CIVITAS, discussed in text accompanying notes 63-64, which expresses
ambivalence about the idea of equality itself.
72. Although I differ with some of her conclusions about the scope of the value of
sex equality, I have found helpful Rosemary Salomone's argument that schools
should teach "common values" or "core values" and her appeal to such sources as
constitutional and statutory law to discern those values. Salomone, supra note 50, at
231-40. She defines "core values" as "so central to the preservation of democratic
government and so basic to the constitutional enterprise that they do not lend
themselves to governmental exemption." Id. at 239. She derives this -core" from
"common history and folklore," from "legal norms established in the federal
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, from federal statutes with
supporting administrative regulations, and from executive orders. Taken together,
these legal pronouncements represent a statement of national consensus." Id. at 233.
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Naming sex equality as a core component of civic virtue leads to a
number of interpretive quandaries and points of tension. What is the
domain of this civic virtue? If it is part of a national core, then what
role do local communities play in defining it? Who should foster it?
Does it relate principally to "public" life (e.g., the right to vote or to
be free from discrimination from governmental actors) or to "private"
life as well (e.g., the workplace, the institutions of civil society, and
most importantly, families)? What is the scope of government's
formative project with respect to sex equality?
Sex equality is relevant both to democratic and personal self-
government, and so it would seem to be more than just a civic virtue.
As noted in Part I, it is a "sovereign" virtue, which should guide how
government treats its citizens, but it is also a principle of political
morality with appropriate spillover. Tough questions involve the
scope of that spillover. That is, does a commitment to this civic virtue
require that all institutions in society cultivate and reflect that virtue,
i.e., should there be congruence?
The issues of domain and congruence are particularly acute with
respect to the idea that our constitutional order depends upon families
to be prominent seedbeds of civic virtue and to foster the capacities
for self-government. There is no easy or persuasive recourse to a
public/private schematic to delineate the domain of sex equality. For
if, as I think is demonstrable, public norms and the legal regime
largely repudiate the law of coverture and accept principles of
equality and anti-subordination between men and women within
marriages, then sex equality already does reach into family, or
"private" life, through laws against domestic violence, marital rape,
and laws abandoning the husband's authority over the wife and
conferring on husbands and wives equal rights and responsibilities
within marriage. (That is not to say that the residue of coverture does
not remain and exert some continuing influence.)
But what about norms of family governance that relate to
responsibility for market and domestic labor? And what of socializing
children concerning appropriate gender roles that may reinforce
stereotypes of masculinity and femininity and sexism in a way that
shapes children's development of their capacities?73 Do these family
norms and socialization processes bear upon personal self-government
and, ultimately, democratic self-government, in a way that would
warrant governmental attention?
73. I am, for example, thinking of the claims about the harmful effects of
prevailing socialization about gender-which perpetuates certain forms of sex
inequality-for both female and male children made in such best-selling books as
Reviving Ophelia and Raising Cain. See Dan Kindlon & Michael Thompson, Raising
Cain: Protecting the Emotional Life of Boys (1999); Mary Pipher, Reviving Ophelia:
Saving the Selves of Adolescent Girls (1994).
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In her recent book, Visions of Schooling, Rosemary Salomone
draws a line between aspects of sex equality as to which there is
national consensus (e.g., a principle of anti-discrimination as to
"public" life, such as the workplace) and matters as to which there is
more cultural ambivalence. In the latter, she includes replacing
traditional gender-specific roles for men and women, in the family and
market, with gender-neutral roles. Because gender equality in this
area is still highly contested, she contends, it is not a part of an
appropriate national consensus, one that schools should teach; rather
"this aspect of the gender equality principle may work more
effectively as a value determined by local consensus rather than as a
national commitment."'74 And CIVITAS, discussed above, notes a
lack of consensus on the application of sex equality to family life, due
to deep disagreements over "proper roles for women and men in
society."'75
However, I think this solution misses the extent to which federal
constitutional norms have put limits upon government's ability to
perpetuate traditional gender roles. As argued above, contemporary
family law and constitutional law have repudiated to a significant
degree the patriarchal model of family governance.76 And with
respect to the question of the division between market and family
labor, the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence has struck down
sex-based classifications in family law, concerning such things as
employee benefits, alimony, and child support, that would perpetuate
the gendered dyad of male breadwinner/female caregiver. In Orr v.
Orr, in which the Court struck a statutory requirement requiring only
men to pay alimony, the Court observed that such a requirement was
part of a larger statutory scheme (reflecting wives' common law
disabilities), "which invidiously discriminated against women,
removing them from the world of work and property and
'compensating' them by making their designated place 'secure."'" As
the Court stated in Stanton v. Stanton, "[n]o longer is the female
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only
the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas."' As Laurence
74. Salomone, supra note 50, at 236-37.
75. CIVITAS, supra note 24, at 273.
76. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (striking down Louisiana
community property law treating husband as "head and master" of property jointly
owned with wife).
77. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 n.9 (1979). The Court also noted the risk that
legislative classifications distributing benefits and burdens on the basis of gender will
reinforce "stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection." Id. at 283.
78. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (striking down sex-based
classification requiring child support for longer period for male children than for
female children); see also Orr, 440 U.S. at 280 (quoting same language; striking down
sex-based classification requiring husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony). For a
discussion of the import of these precedents, see Mary Ann Case, Response to
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Tribe has observed of the laws invalidated in such cases:
All either prevented, or economically discouraged, departures from
"traditional" sex roles, freezing biology into social destiny. And
government's almost uniform argument in justification of these laws
emphasized the economy achieved by the accurate and therefore
"rational" assumption of traditional male and female inclinations
and capacities. The Supreme Court's thoughtful response to this
argument has recognized the argument's essence as self-fulfilling
prophecy: The "accuracy" of government's assumption is derived in
some significant degree from the chill on sex-role experimentation
and change generated by the classifications themselves. While that
may have been thought permissible as late as 1948, when the Court
declared that "the Constitution does not require legislatures to
reflect... shifting social standards," thirty years later the Court
decidedly came to view "shifting social standards" as controlling.79
In light of this constitutional jurisprudence, it is not so simple to
relegate the question of family roles and the gendered division of
household labor to local, rather than national, concern.
As discussed above, sex equality is a sovereign virtue, applicable to
how government should treat citizens and constitute family rights and
responsibilities. Yet that constitutional norm concerning
governmental structuring of family roles and governance does not
preclude individual family members from choosing certain gendered
roles or from engaging in forms of socialization that reproduce such
gendered roles. What interests does government have in this
gendered division of labor?
Should a formative project seek to bring about closer congruence
between family governance and sex equality? Does government's
interest in fostering the capacities not only of adults but also of
children warrant such congruence? If one accepts an idea of pluralism
that values institutions of civil society as "multiple sites of
sovereignty,"8 or if one believes that such principles as toleration and
respect for diversity require that government should not impose an
orthodoxy, what implications follow for sex equality within families?
What are the competing values to assess in sorting out just how much
diversity is appropriate or properly protected? To answer those
questions, I will first examine the idea that families are seedbeds of
civic virtue. I will then return to the question of the domain of sex
equality and the role of families and schools in fostering it.
Kathleen Sullivan's Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2001).
79. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1565 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnotes omitted).
80. See Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 477 (2000).
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III. THE DOMAIN OF FAMILIES AS "SEEDBEDS OF CIVIC VIRTUE"
A. Why Families Matter: The Example of the Family Meal
Recently, then-President Clinton convened the "first-ever White
House Conference on Teenagers," which brought together parents,
teens, policy makers, and other experts to discuss "the importance of
the teenage years in the social and intellectual development of
children," and to offer "strategies for raising responsible and
resourceful youth.""1 The President released a report by his Council
of Economic Advisers that found that two factors, a teenager's sense
that she has a close relationship with her parents and the practice of
eating dinner together, as a family, significantly reduced the likelihood
of a teenager's engagement in risky, harmful behavior-such as
alcohol and drug use, thoughts of suicide or suicide attempts, early
sexual involvement-and significantly increased such behaviors as
achieving success in high school and attending college." Both of these
factors, which suggest forms of connection between parents and teens,
seem to affirm the vital importance of parental involvement in helping
teens. If this is so, then it may be of concern that, recently, Robert
Putnam reported that the evening meal, a "traditionally important
form of family connectedness," is in dramatic decline among married
Americans.83
It is useful to consider whether and how this parental involvement
is, in effect, fostering civic virtue. Why do families matter and what
warrants the focus of the White House on the family meal? Is it the
contribution to democratic self-government, personal self-
government, or to both? The governmental report gives no data on
what actually transpires during the family meal, and how this helps
teenagers-especially if the family routinely keeps the television on (if
not watches it) during the meal." But the importance attached to the
family meal brings to mind civic republican/communitarian appeals to
"table talk" as an important site for "dialogues about freedom and
responsibility, individual and community, present and future," as well
81. Press Release, The White House at Work, The Clinton-Gore Administration:
Working to Help Families Raise Responsible Teenagers (May 2, 2000) (on file with
author).
82. Council of Economic Advisers, Teens and Their Parents in the 21st Century:
An Examination of Trends in Teen Behavior and the Role of Parental Involvement
18-23 (2000).
83. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 100 (2000) (reporting that "[tlhe fraction
of married Americans who say 'definitely' that 'our whole family usually eats dinner
together' has declined by a third over the last twenty years, from about 50 percent to
34 percent").
84. Id. at 227 (reporting that "[r]oughly half of all Americans-married and single,
parents and childless-report watching television while eating dinner, and nearly one-
third do so during breakfast and lunch").
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as for "stories about relationships, obligations, and the long-term
consequences of present acts and decisions." 5
If parents are able to arrange their lives (e.g., their employment
schedule) to allow the cultivation of this close relationship and to
honor the ritual of the family meal, then this may well contribute
valuably to fostering a teenager's capacities for self-government and
success in life. But this contribution is not simply to the teenager's
development of civic virtue, a vital component of democratic self-
government. The very benefits mentioned in the Report that stem
from close parental attachment suggest that the contribution is also to
the teen's capacities for personal self-government, or governing the
self, in areas including negotiating friendships and sexual
relationships, in the sense of not harming one's body or mental
development, developing one's intellectual capacities, and finding
one's own path in life. 6 Social science research about parental
contributions to children's success in life bears out the importance of
close attachment.8 For example, the literature on how adolescents
develop their own sense of identity points to a "secure sense of
attachment to parents" as affording an adolescent "a safe foundation
from which to explore and sample life alternatives and make self-
chosen commitments to life directions." 88
Whatever the benefits of a close parent-child relationship to
personal self-government, it may or may not guarantee the cultivation
of civic virtue. For example, a benign type of spillover from personal
to democratic self-government would be if close families cultivated
dispositions of cooperation and reciprocity among members-a sense
of engagement in a common enterprise and a willingness to share
burdens and help each other-that they, in turn, demonstrated outside
the family, in dealings with the broader polity. For "generalized
reciprocity," according to Robert Putnam's recent book, Bowling
Alone, is the "touchstone of social capital," 9 and it also is, on many
accounts, an important civic virtue." Yet, in close families, parents
85. Glendon, supra note 30, at 174. I have to confess that in earlier work I have
been skeptical about the potential of table talk to foster democratic self-government.
McClain & Fleming, supra note 5, at 311.
86. See Counsel of Economic Advisers, supra note 82, at 18-23. In the same way, I
would argue that community-based programs that help to empower disadvantaged
adolescent females to invest in their education and to defer pregnancy and
motherhood cultivate those young women's general capacities for democratic and
personal self-government.
87. David Popenoe, The Roots of Declining Social Virtue: Family, Community,
and the Need for a "Natural Communities Policy," in Seedbeds of Virtue, supra note
34, at 71, 74-79 (summarizing social science research about the importance of
emotional attachment to successful child development).
88. Dennis R. Papini, Family Interventions, in Interventions for Adolescent
Identity Development 47,52 (Sally L. Archer ed., 1994).
89. Putnam, supra note 83, at 134.
90. See, e.g., Dagger, supra note 19, at 197 ("The virtuous citizen has a strong
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may teach children prejudicial and intolerant attitudes toward those
who differ. Thus, the literature on identity formation suggests that in
families in which children had a strong sense of closeness and
security, parents often were "mistrustful" of the outside world, and
inculcated attitudes in children that left them, as adults, unable to
"establish enough trust outside the family" to form friendships." It
would seem, to use the terminology that Putnam employs, that such
families may foster "bonding" (or exclusive) social capital, but not the
sort of "bridging" (inclusive) social capital that can generate broader
identities and reciprocity. 92
To take a slightly different example, imagine, despite peer pressure
and possible negative employment sanctions, that an employed father
takes parental leave, or adopts a more flexible work schedule to care
for and nurture his child. This care giving may not, at this stage,
directly foster the child's development of civic virtue, but it
contributes to the child's human development and helps lay the
foundations for the child's eventual development of the capacities for
both democratic and personal self-government. That is, providing
children the care, nurturing, and moral education necessary to become
good people ultimately helps them to become good citizens. But
rather than viewing the father's nurturing behavior as a direct and
immediate contribution to the child's civic virtue, it seems more apt to
think of it as an act that may indirectly, or eventually, foster civic
virtue. By contrast, if the same father, some years hence, adopts a
flexible work schedule to allow him to spend more time with his
teenager, and part of this time is devoted to moral and civic education,
especially during the evening meal, it is easier to make the case that
the father's approach to the work/family conflict directly fosters civic
virtue.
A final example suggesting that current concern about
strengthening families relates at least as much to families' role in
fostering personal self-government, or governing the self, as to
democratic self-government is current political efforts to encourage
"responsible fatherhood," that is, to promote the positive, active
engagement of fathers in the rearing of their children. The primary
appeal is not to foster children's civic virtue and improve their future
civic participation, as measured in, for example, voting rates or
attendance of public meetings. Rather, the claim is that children with
involved fathers have better life prospects because they are more
likely to stay in school, achieve success in school, avoid (in the case of
male children) committing crime, and are less likely to engage in a
sense of reciprocity-of the need to bear a fair share of the burdens of a cooperative
enterprise and to insist that others bear their share as well.").
91. Ruthellen Josselson, Finding Herself 65 (1987) (describing the family
characteristics of women in the "Identity Foreclosure" category).
92. See Putnam, supra note 83, at 22-23.
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range of harmful behaviors such as drug and alcohol abuse, and early
parenthood. 93 And it should not be missed that a core element of the
movement is increasing fathers' financial support of their children, as
the tenor of the rhetoric of "deadbeat" dads has shifted to
"deadbroke" dads and empowering low-income men to be better
providers and marriage partners. Of course, in this respect it is
possible to argue that this movement fosters at least two virtues that
could be thought of as civic virtues: the virtue of self-sufficiency,
which includes not being "needlessly" dependent upon governmental
financial support, and the virtue of being law-abiding.94 Nonetheless,
it seems that much of the keen political interest in fathers'
involvement in families relates more to securing better outcomes for
children's personal self-government, or success in life, and to reducing
the number of negative externalities suffered by society when
children's lives do not go well.
In sum, the idea of families as "seedbeds" valuably recognizes that
families are important places of growth and development of a wide
range of human capacities and virtues, including civic virtue. Even the
discontinuity approach that I identified with political liberalism holds
that families have the important task of ensuring the "nurturing and
93. President Bush's proposed budget includes $64 million to promote
"responsible fatherhood" through providing competitive grants to faith-based and
community based organizations. Tommy G. Thompson, Testimony, Health and
Human Service's Fiscal 2002 Budget (Federal Document Clearing House), Mar. 6
2001. Such funds "will be used to support programs that help low-income and
unemployment fathers and their families to avoid dependence on welfare, and to fund
programs that promote successful parenting and marriage." Id. (testimony of
Thompson). Members of Congress plan to reintroduce the Responsible Fatherhood
Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives during the last Congress but
not enacted. See Fatherhood Efforts Get Historic Boost from Congress (Evan Bayh
News Release) at http://www.senate.gov\-bayh\Press\2000\19DECOOpr.htm. Former
Vice President Gore has been a champion of "responsible fatherhood" as the next
phase of welfare reform. See Al Gore Proposes Next Step in Welfare Reform: Help for
Responsible Parents, Crackdown on Deadbeat Dads, available at
http://www.algore2000.com/briefingroom/releases/pr_102099_welfare_reform.html.
Nearly every state has a task force on responsible fatherhood. See National Center for
Children in Poverty, Map and Track: State Initiatives to Encourage Responsible
Fatherhood, 1999 Edition, available at http://cpmcnet.columbia.eduldept/nccp/
MT99text.html.
94. See Galston, supra note 23, at 221-22 (including independence, which means
avoiding "becoming needlessly dependent on others," and law-abidingness among
"liberal virtues"); The Role of Civic Education, supra note 20, at 6-7 (advocating that
civic education develop dispositions such as self-discipline, so that citizens adhere
voluntarily to self-imposed standards of behavior rather than requiring the imposition
of external controls). Recent political rhetoric of supporting "working families"
suggests that some degree of governmental support is appropriate, so long as families
"play by the rules" and make an effort to support themselves. Elsewhere I suggest
that this rhetoric has the potential to open the door to a more robust and sustained
focus upon the role of care in fostering human and social capital. See Linda C.
McClain, Citizenship Begins at Home: Building Support for Working Families into the
New Social Contract of Supporting 'Working Families,' in Progressive Politics in the
Global Age (Henry Tam ed., forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter McClain, Citizenship].
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development" of citizens, who must "have a sense of justice and the
political virtues that support political and social institutions. "' It
would be a useful corrective to regard such caregiving as an act with
important civic dimensions and to recognize care as a precondition for
both democratic and personal self-government. Indeed, it seems all
the more important, given the vital role of families in fostering
capacities for self-government, to address the lingering problems of
sex inequality within families.
B. Why Families Matter, Part II: Or, Does Government Have an
Interest in Who Does the Dishes?
1. The Case of Fundamentalist Families
I offered the case of the family meal and of the involved father as
benign examples of how fostering the capacities for self-government
may pertain both to democratic and personal self-government. But
the case of fundamentalist families appears to be one of a less benign
effect of family involvement on civic virtue and even a clash between
family self-governance and the fostering of civic virtue, especially the
virtue of sex equality. What, exactly, is the conflict here? I am
assuming that, as commonly defined, a religious fundamentalist is one
whose religion requires literal interpretation of scripture (such as the
Bible). There is assumed to be a literal scriptural foundation for a
patriarchal family governance structure of husband as "head" of the
household, both as breadwinner and as authority, and wife as
caregiver/homemaker and submissive or deferential to the husband's
authority.97 Religious fundamentalism appears to have a significant
effect on the preference for this kind of patriarchal family," and
conservative Christian views about women's proper domestic roles as
wife and mother appear to exert a significant effect on women's labor
force participation, such that "fundamentalist women are significantly
95. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, at 788.
96. This is an argument that I advance elsewhere, drawing on a range of feminist,
liberal and progressive work. See Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value" Linking
Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 77 Chi.-Kent. L Rev. (forthcoming
2001); McClain, Citizenship, supra note 94. For important arguments to recognize
care as a public value, on which I draw, see Mona Harrington, Care and Equality:
Inventing a New Family Politics (1999); Kittay, supra note 7, at 115-81; Martha
Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and
Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am. U. J. Gender, Soc. Pol'y & L. 13 (2000); Deborah Stone, Why
We Need A Care Movement, The Nation, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13; see also in the present
symposium Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics atud a Progressive
Constitution, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2007 (2001).
97. See Harold G. Grasmick et al., The Effects of Religious Fundamentalism and
Religiosity on Preference for Traditional Family Norms, 60 Soc. Inquiry 352, 353
(1990). Recall the recent Southern Baptist declaration that wives should graciously
submit to their husband's authority.
98. Id.
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more likely to choose the home as their career in their early life
course."99 Fundamentalist families may well socialize their children
into this religious tradition and into gender roles that would replicate
this division of labor and authority/submission model. There is also
some evidence that while fundamentalist parents are supportive of
their fundamentalist sons' educational pursuits, they are less
supportive if their children are nonfundamentalist, and especially so
for female nonfundamentalist children."° Such families increasingly
choose home schooling in an effort to insulate their children from the
secular world and to prevent their children's exposure to conflicting
values. 0 1 Religious fundamentalists regard secular education, such as
civic education aimed at teaching tolerance and respect for difference
that would expose their children to different ways of life (without
clearly affirming the superiority of their own way), as deeply
threatening.' 2
To this basic account, one can add many variations, each of which
may alter one's perceptions of the potential magnitude of the problem
or the argument for governmental attention. For example, as Susan
Moller Okin poses the problem, assume that the children are
"educated entirely at religious schools and within the church, temple,
or mosque" and "that all of these 'nonpolitical' settings inculcate and
reinforce in them the belief that there is a natural, god-given hierarchy
of the sexes, each with its own proper sphere-the female's being
narrow, circumscribed, and without authority, and the male's the
opposite."0 3 The literature on international economic development
99. Darren E. Sherkat, "That They Be Keepers of the Home": The Effect of
Conservative Religion on Early and Late Transitions Into Housewifery, 41 Rev. of
Religious Res. 344, 354 (2000). But Sherkat also found that "fundamentalist women
are likely to reenter the workforce when their children are older." Id.
100. Darrren E. Sherkat & Alfred Darnell, The Effect of Parents' Fundamentalism
on Children's Educational Attainment: Examining Differences by Gender and
Children's Fundamentalism, 38 J. Sci. Study of Religion 23 (1999).
101. Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2000, (Magazine), at
34.
102. See infra Part IV.B.1.
103. Susan Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 Ethics 23, 29
(1994) [hereinafter Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender]. At least as Okin
poses the hypothetical, it is confined to religious fundamentalist families, and does not
apply to "most" families in the U.S. and other liberal democracies. Thus, in Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Okin extends her focus on families to the problem
of whether Western democracies should recognize group rights for minority cultures
present within those democracies. Okin contrasts families in liberal cultures such as
the United States (with the exception of religious fundamentalists):
women in more liberal cultures are... legally guaranteed many of the same
freedoms and opportunities as men. In addition, most families in such
cultures, with the exception of some religious fundamentalists, do not
communicate to their daughters that they are of less value than boys, that
their lives are to be confined to domesticity and service to men and children,
and that their sexuality is of value only in marriage, in the service of men,
and for reproductive ends. This situation, as we have seen, is quite different
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documents that in some instances, a mixture of religious and cultural
influences leads families to favor their sons over their daughters in
such concrete resources as education, food, health care, and leisure
time.1" Or suppose that the parents, pursuant to their religious
convictions, teach their children a sexual code which condemns all
premarital sexual activity, as well as any dating, any use of
contraception or abortion, and gay and lesbian sexuality.
The case of the fundamentalist family is usefully understood as
posing an especially sharp version of the general question about the
domain of sex equality. For public repudiation of coverture and the
erosion of separate-spheres ideology seems to stand in tension with
private orderings and world views that reinforce traditional gender
roles of male authority and female deference and that see the
"traditional dichotomy between male and female spheres as critical to
the preservation of family life."1" What makes the fundamentalist
family hypothetical so troubling is the role of literalism and of a
scriptural foundation for sex inequality, because this seems to entail a
rejection of critical reflection or of any right to independent judgment
or interpretation.
2. Gender Roles in Families and Government's Interest
in Sex Equality
Fundamentalist families are by no means the only families in which
a gendered division of labor exists, or persists. If government's
commitment to sex equality includes an interest in how adult family
members divide the responsibility for market work and for caretaking
and housework, as well as about how parents socialize and form their
children, that interest will apply to many households. When Okin
highlighted male political theorists' inattention to justice within the
family, she targeted widespread practices in contemporary families of
the disproportionate allocation to women of responsibility for
housework and caregiving.16 She also pointed to the problem of male
domination and violence within families, arguing that if families are
"not environments in which justice is normally practiced, work equally
shared, and people treated with equal dignity and respect-if they are
often instead places where injustice ranges from moderate unfairness
to outright abuse, then how are children to develop the sense of
from that of women in many of the world's other cultures, including many of
those from which immigrants to Europe and North America come.
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? 16-17 (1999) [hereinafter
Okin, Multiculturalism]. For critical responses to Okin, which I do not address here,
see id. at 27-113.
104. See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 122-25 (1992), Amartya Sen, More
Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Dec. 20, 1990).
105. Salomone, supra note 50, at 236.
106. Okin, Justice, supra note 4, at 138-41.
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justice that they need if the well-ordered society is to be stable?"'' 7
Here, the concern with injustice within the family goes both to the
adult members of the family and to the children within it. Okin
contended that a "genderless" family, in which roles and
responsibilities were divided in an egalitarian manner, would be
"more just to women" and "more conducive to [their] equal
opportunity," as well as to the equal opportunity for the children of
both sexes.108 Most relevant to the discussion of families as seedbeds
of virtue is her claim that an egalitarian or genderless family "creates
a more favorable environment for the rearing of citizens of a just
society."' 9 In a recent article, Okin fortifies her argument by
appealing to the literature on children's moral development,
suggesting that "[t]he development of children's innate potential for
empathy therefore seems crucial to a major segment of their moral
thinking and moral action [and] their sense of justice.""' In other
words, families may serve as seedbeds in playing a crucial role in
developing "moral citizens" by nurturing "the qualities that are at the
root of the more complex virtues.""' However, Okin argues, unless
two-parent, heterosexual households change their gender structure
and become more equal, they will not be well suited to foster such
empathy. Her claim is that a two-parent, heterosexual household is
"the first model of how [children see] two adults who are different
from each other in a socially salient way interact with each other;" if
that household presents a model of a male sense of entitlement and a
female sense of subservience, this will hinder the development of
empathy."2 By contrast, "with sex equality as a fundamental norm,
children are surely less likely to grow into the habit of understanding
differences such as those of race or ethnicity as reasons for unequal or
disrespectful treatment."' 3
In other words, if families, in a good society, are to play a role in
fostering virtues necessary for personal and democratic self-
government, society's concern to foster sex equality and justice
extends to the garden-variety household with the "second shift"
familiar from feminist analysis, in which women bear disproportionate
responsibility for the caregiving and household work, no matter
whether they participate in the paid labor force or not. Government
does have an interest in who does the dishes, as well as myriad other
household tasks. This interest derives from fostering the capacities of
107. Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, supra note 103, at 38.
108. Okin, Justice, supra note 4, at 183.
109. Id.
110. Susan Moller Okin & Rob Reich, Families and Schools as Compensating
Agents in Moral Development for a Multicultural Society, 28 J. Moral Educ. 283, 286
(1999).
111. Id. at 288.
112. Id. at290.
113. Id.
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children and adults for self-government. It also derives from its
interest in promoting the principle of sex equality.
Gendered divisions of labor in the home and continuing adherence
to a male breadwinner/female caregiver model-despite women's
increased movement into the paid labor force-are hardly unique to
fundamentalist or even to religiously observant families. Admittedly,
the empirical picture is complicated. On the one hand, recent studies
report the problematic "persistence of traditional marital roles," at
least in terms of women specializing in domestic labor and men in
market labor."' Feminist scholar Joan Williams contends that this
model of "[d]omesticity remains the entrenched, almost unquestioned,
American norm and practice." ' In Bowling Alone, Putnam claims
that "virtually all the increase in full-time employment of American
women over the last twenty years is attributable to financial pressures,
not personal fulfillment."1 6 Moreover, the phenomenon of women
choosing to leave the full-time labor force for either part-time work or
full-time caregiving and homemaking is common."' On the other
hand, recent data suggests that families in which both parents are
engaged in paid labor have become the majority (albeit, barely so),
even among married couples with children." 8  However, women
continue to perform a disproportionate share of household labor,
although data also suggests there has been some increase both in
fathers' assumption of domestic labor and in fathers serving as
"primary" caregivers within families.119
Whatever the precise empirical picture, the question remains: if
mothers still assume disproportionate responsibility for caregiving and
domestic labor within families, and if families tend to reproduce this
gendered division of responsibility in children, then what appropriate
114. Ira Mark ElIman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic
Persistence of Traditional Marital Roles, 34 Fam. L.Q. 1, 2 (2000).
115. Joan Williams, Unbending Gender. Why Family and Work Conflict and What
To Do About It 1 (2000). Williams reports a survey finding that two-thirds of
Americans believed it would be best if women stayed home to care for their families
and children. Id. at 2.
116. Putnam, supra note 83, at 197.
117. See generally Williams, supra note 115, at 2-6 (discussing the conflict women
face between work and domesticity).
118. Amara Bachu & Martin O'Connell, Fertility of American Women: Population
Characteristics (U.S. Census Bureau, June 1998); Tamar Lewin, Now a Majority:
Families With 2 Parents Who Work, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,2000, at A20 (reporting data
from Census Bureau Report).
119. Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor Modeling and Measuring the
Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work, 62 J. Marriage & the Fam. 1208, 1208
(2000) ("Although the vast majority of both men and women now agree that family
labor should be shared, few men assume equal responsibility for household tasks,"
and "[o]n average, women perform two or three times as much house work as men");
Lynne M. Casper, My Daddy Takes Care of Me! Fathers as Care Providers, Current
Population Reports (Census Bureau, Sept. 1997) (reporting increase in number of
fathers taking care of preschoolers during time mothers are working).
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role should government play in addressing family self-governance?
Should a polity committed to sex equality as a public value and
constitutional norm attempt to ensure that families constitute
themselves and that parents constitute children in ways that are
consistent with and foster sex equality? If families are to serve as
seedbeds of civic virtue, or schools for citizenship, does this require a
particular form of family or of family governance, or that families
inculcate a particular set of civic virtues and values? Or should
respect for rights of intimate association, freedom of religion, and
parental autonomy prevent government from reaching these aspects
of family life? Could government adopt "gentler" or "milder" forms
of action short of outright prohibition or direct regulation? Are there
ameliorative efforts that government-and institutions of civil
society-might undertake to counter the effects of practices that are
not congruent with sex equality?
These are hard questions, for they involve not only difficult
empirical questions about the actual effects of associational life,
within families, on democratic self-government, but also how to
reconcile competing constitutional principles, not to mention
significant prudential concerns. My proposed framework for thinking
about these questions begins with the idea that government's
legitimate interest in the family relates to how families function in the
constitutional order. Government has two interests here. One is in
how adult men and women structure their family lives and what
impact that has on their development of civic virtue and capacity for
self-government. The second interest concerns children and their
interests and development within families. Government has a strong
interest in children developing the capacities for responsible self-
government and in families fostering in children respect for civic
virtues and public values. As discussed above, families may
contribute to cultivating civic virtue, but they also allow persons to
realize goods of intimate association, nurture human development,
and thus foster human and social capital.
I believe that government should not attempt to enforce complete
congruence between democratic values and family structure and
values. However, violence and domination are legitimate objects of
governmental regulation. In light of the repudiation of coverture, and
of the jurisprudence of constitutional sex equality, systems of private
family governance that attempt to replicate coverture and women's
political subordination deviate too sharply from the requirements of
civic virtue. Households that seek to force children into such
arrangements do not serve as seedbeds of civic virtue and do not seem
to fit within the boundaries of "reasonable" moral pluralism. Okin
persuasively argues that a liberal anti-caste principle that would
condemn and render unreasonable world views that "assert the right
to a mode of life involving serfdom or slavery" or that require "'the
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repression or degradation of certain persons on, say, racial, or ethnic,
or perfectionistic grounds"' similarly would apply to world views
rejecting sex equality and "advocat[ing] and practic[ing] the
dependency and submissiveness of women.""0 In fact, some features
of such family governance, such as Okin's reference to domination
and "outfight abuse" may conflict with legal norms as well as moral
norms. For example, government properly prohibits family violence
and, in public awareness campaigns about domestic violence, sends a
message that contradicts any assumption that such violence is a
"private" matter or that family life affords a space immune from
protection against violence.' Moreover, I would support mandatory
premarital counseling that educates persons seeking to marry about
the history and repudiation of coverture and current laws condemning
intimate violence.
When practices of sex inequality within families affect children in
ways that pose harm to them by significantly impairing the
development of their capacities for personal and democratic self-
government, government would have a strong interest in preventing
or ameliorating those practices. Indeed, as a constitutional matter,
this flows readily from-and could build upon-government's well-
established parens patriae interest in children's well being and healthy
development."2 For example, if parents forbid female children from
attending school it may well violate state laws imposing parental
duties of support and trigger laws aimed at protecting children against
abuse and neglect."2
120. Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, supra note 103, at 30-31; see
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xxix ("The same equality of the
Declaration of Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be
invoked to condemn the inequality and oppression of women."). In critiquing Rawls'
political liberalism for its principle of toleration of reasonable comprehensive moral
views, Susan Moller Okin fears that Rawls' "emphasis on toleration of a wide range of
comprehensive philosophical, religious, and moral doctrines comes into conflict with
some important means by which greater equality between the sexes might be
promoted." Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, supra note 103, at 28.
121. For example, New York City has carried out prominent public awareness
campaigns along these lines (e.g., with dramatic subway advertisements) and recently
enacted the first municipal civil rights law in the nation protecting against gender-
motivated violence. See Nina Bernstein, Council Readies Unique Ser Bias Measure,
N.Y.Times, Dec. 1, 2000, at B3.
122 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding against
constitutional challenge application of state law prohibiting child labor to child
distributing religious pamphlets). Although I do not necessarily endorse the result in
Prince, I cite it for the general principle that government may promote children's
well-being even in certain instances of conflicts with parental autonomy and religious
convictions.
123. But, under existing understandings of abuse and neglect laws, the rationale for
invoking such laws would focus on the issue of harm and would not likely focus on
government's interest in sex equality. Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg,
Child, Family, and State: Problems and Materials on Children and the Law 310-29
(4th ed. 2000) (discussing provision of education as part of parental support
1649
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
I also believe that it is appropriate for government to promote the
virtue of sex equality-and to repudiate the idea that women's and
men's place in society is due to the innate capacities thought to follow
from their sex-and to promote sex equality as an ideal important to
family self-governance. However, a commitment to pluralism, to
respect for diversity, to experiments in living, and to the idea that our
understandings of such values as sex equality evolve over time
cautions against a hard governmental line that there is only one way
to embody sex equality in families. This seems especially appropriate
in light of ongoing cultural exploration of appropriate family roles,
and the persistence of some form of traditional roles. I think it is also
appropriate in light of difficult empirical questions about the effects of
the dynamics of family life and family values on capacities for
democratic self-government. 124
Finally, this pluralistic model is also appropriate in light of the idea
of the institutions of civil society serving as buffers against
government. Whatever zeal one might have in enlisting government
to bring about egalitarian families, it is wise to be wary of
governmental power to enforce orthodoxies about family life. This
has served to exclude many families from equal respect and to subject
many families to intrusive governmental control."2 As I have argued
elsewhere, one important role played by the institutions of civil
society, in a democracy in which perfect justice is never achieved, is to
serve as what Jane Mansbridge has called "enclaves of protected
discourse and action," where "counterpublics" can work out and
nurture alternative conceptions of self, community, and justice . 26 I
obligation). I leave for exploration elsewhere what impact the idea of government's
affirmative responsibility to carry out a formative project to foster capacity would
have on abuse and neglect laws. I assume that if a family practice seriously impaired a
child's development of her or his capacities, this would trigger a strong governmental
interest in some form of prevention, intervention, or amelioration. Cf Martha C.
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 275 (2000)
(arguing that the state should not intervene in the conduct of family members without
a compelling interest, but that "such a compelling interest is always supplied by the
protection of the central capabilities.").
124. In her extensive study of the psychology of associational life, Nancy
Rosenblum did not study families. Her study of a number of other forms of
association concluded that the effects of participation in such associations were
"intedeterminate," although they did seem to lead to a certain "democracy of
everyday life," which included the virtue of reciprocity. See Rosenblum, supra note
11, at 8-10, 15-17, 349-63. Although Okin makes various hypotheses about the impact
of gendered family life on democratic self-government, testing these would call for
some sort of empirical evaluation that I do not attempt here.
125. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual
Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 177-93 (1995) (discussing regulation
of and lack of privacy accorded families headed by single mothers, in contrast to
rhetoric of family privacy).
126. McClain & Fleming, supra note 5, at 318 (citing Jane Mansbridge, Using
Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the
Boundaries of the Political 46,55 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)).
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think this idea is also useful as applied to one function families may
serve. For example, scholars have written of the way in which
African-American families feel the need to socialize their children
both to fit into the surrounding majority culture and to cultivate an
oppositional consciousness that will protect them against the types of
discrimination and prejudice they face.127 Also, in the face of hostile
and negative images, as well as a lack of social and (in most states)
legal validation of their intimate lives, gay men and lesbians must
actively construct their own models of family and of family values."
In addition, this pluralistic model attempts to give a proper place to
constitutional principles of toleration and decisional liberty. Indeed, it
is striking that even the most ardent proponent of the genderless
family, Okin herself, invokes such liberal principles as toleration to
hold back from government compelling families to adopt an
egalitarian division of labor. Invoking such principles, in light of a
pluralism of beliefs about, and lack of cultural consensus concerning,
gender within families, Okin urges a two-fold approach: government
should encourage genderless families, and tolerates (but seek to limit
the harmful effects of) traditional gendered division of labor: "public
policy.., must allow families to divide roles along the line of
gender,.., it should [not] either encourage only women to assume
care-taking roles.., or allow the division of labour to be practised in
such a way that women in traditionally female roles are economically
dependent upon men or rendered servile in relation to them."'"
Specifically, she has advocated mandatory wage-splitting in "two-
parent families who do not believe in or wish to practise shared
parental roles.""13 Rawls' own response to Okin makes clear that,
although government should tolerate "voluntary" divisions of labor
within families, it must seek to reduce the involuntary division of
labor. "If a basic.., cause of women's inequality is their greater share
in the bearing, nurturing, and caring for children in the traditional
division of labor within the family," political liberalism would support
taking steps "to equalize their share, or to compensate them for it.''
As I have discussed elsewhere, I believe that Rawls' response to
Okin's criticism of political liberalism makes clear that a more
127. See Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist
Theorizing about Motherhood, in Motherhood: Ideology, Experience, and Agency
(Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994); see also Fredrick C. Harris, Will the Circle be
Unbroken?: The Erosion and Transformation of African-American Civic Life, in Civil
Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal 317, 323-24 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999)
(describing "oppositional civic culture" characteristic of African-Americans' civic
life).
128. See Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (1991);
Suzanne Slater, The Lesbian Family Life Cycle (1995).
129. Okin & Reich, supra note 110, at 285.
130. Id. at 290; Okin, Justice, supra note 4, at 181-82.
131. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, at 792-93.
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robustly feminist political liberalism could support governmental
measures both to increase women's equality within families and to
address injustices within families that "undermine children's capacity
to acquire the political virtues required of future citizens in a viable
democratic society.' 132
Feminist work has usefully illuminated the significant ways in which
existing public policy fails to promote sex equality within families,
encouraging, through the structure of social security and tax laws,
women to invest in uncompensated homemaking rather than wage
earning, while also devaluing such labor. 33 I concur with Okin that it
is a legitimate governmental concern to foster sex equality within
families, both because of government's interest in the capacities of
adults as well as of children. But with respect to some forms of sex
inequality, respect for pluralism should stay government's hand from
coercion, even though other measures may be appropriate. In recent
work, Martha Nussbaum seems to draw a similar distinction between
coercion and other measures: she finds that it would seem "an
intolerable infringement of liberty for the state to get involved in
dictating how people do their dishes," yet she supports governmental
measures to change traditional decision-making and division of
domestic labor within families, because "rethinking the division of
labor in the family is a crucial aspect of guaranteeing women's full
equality as citizens." 134
I take the view that sex equality is a relevant principle whose
domain includes family self-governance, yet there are other principles
that suggest limits to how far government should seek to promote sex
equality within families. One reason that I resist a complete model of
congruence is that I find persuasive the idea that government can use
other means to promote important public values. This is one
component of government's formative project. I also believe that
governmental institutions may play an ameliorative, or compensatory,
132. McClain, Toleration, supra note 5, at 111 (quoting Rawls, Public Reason
Revisited, supra note 28, at 790-91). Whether or not Okin's specific proposals of wage-
splitting or other remedies to equalize income upon divorce are optimal solutions for
protecting vulnerabilities arising from traditional gender roles, or whether other
economic measures would be preferable, is not the issue that I wish to take up here.
See Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice 117-22 (1999) (contending that Okin's proposal is
too intrusive upon adult men and women's ordering of their intimate and economic
lives and would not, in any case, achieve its objectives).
133. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women (1997) (discussing federal income
tax policy); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social
Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 264 (1989) (discussing how Social Security disadvantages women); Katherine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1
(1996) (discussing the legal treatment of housework throughout the law); Nancy C.
Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L.J. 1571 (1996) (advocating the treatment of
household work as taxable labor).
134. Nussbaum, supra note 123, at 280-83 (emphasis added).
1652 [Vol. 69
2001] FAMILIES, SCHOOLS AND SEX EQUALITY
role in fostering civic virtues. In the final part of this article, I turn to
one important example: the role of public schools as domains in
which civic virtue is cultivated, as one component of schools' broader
formative project of fostering the capacities for self-government.
IV. WHY SCHOOLS MATTER: PREPARING CHILDREN FOR
CMZENSHIP AND FOR SUCCESS IN LIFE
How might we envision the dual authority of families and schools
for fostering the capacities for self-government, in the sense of
preparing children both to be good citizens and to live good,
successful lives? I will focus in particular upon schools as domains in
which the virtue of sex equality should be fostered. Schools are
prominent among the "seedbeds of civic virtue" championed by civil
society proponents. To return to the same question I asked of
families, do schools matter primarily because of their contribution to
children's capacities for democratic self-government, for personal self-
government, or for both?
A. The Dual Authority of Families and Schools for Fostering
Children's Capacities
As a matter of constitutional law, the familiar course of discussions
of family governance, as it relates to children, is to note the dual
authority of families and government with respect to fostering
children's capacities. It is tempting to try to posit some simple
division of labor between families and schools that would avoid the
difficult problems posed by conflicts between parental and school
authority, or objectives, concerning fostering children's capacities.
One such division would be that it is the responsibility of parents to
teach children to be good people and to nurture, care for, and provide
for them. Public schools, as an instrument of the state, teach children
how to be good citizens and equip them to participate in our
constitutional democracy.
This is a neat schematic, with important elements of truth in it.
Thus, as the Supreme Court recently affirmed, our constitutional
order recognizes "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."'35 The
Court quoted favorably from such earlier precedents as Pierce v.
Society of Sisters and Prince v. Massachusetts affirming a primary
allocation of authority to parents: "'[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations."' 1  Moreover, literature about such
135. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 2054,2060 (2000) (citation omitted).
136. Id (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (brackets in
original)) ("'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
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matters as character education repeatedly states that families and
other institutions of civil society bear primary responsibility for
developing ethical behavior and character in children.1 37
Similarly, with respect to schools, it is often argued that "schools...
bear a special and historic responsibility for the development of
competent and responsible citizens." 138 One key purpose behind the
movement to establish common public schools was to use education in
common schools to shape children from a diverse array of ethnic
backgrounds and national origins into citizens unified behind a shared
political morality and set of ideals. 139 The landmark case of Brown v.
Board of Education referred to education as "the very foundation of
good citizenship,"'40 and, in subsequent opinions, the Court has
characterized the objectives of public education as the "'inculcat[ion
of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system."" 4
However, this simple division of labor between molding the good
person and the good citizen cannot hold. First, as I have discussed
above, a central claim in the calls to revive civil society is that families
are-or should be strengthened so they can be-first and foremost
among the "seedbeds of civic virtue." The idea that families play an
important, even indispensable role in forming persons so they can be
good citizens has a long history. Second, a closer look at the aims of
public schools today-both what such schools aspire to do and what
they actually do-reveals that much more than civic education, or
preparation for citizenship, is at stake. Perhaps a better way to put
the point is that preparation for citizenship is defined very broadly, so
that it includes preparation to succeed in life. Undeniably, a core aim
of public education pertains to preparation for citizenship. Thus, in
Brown, in which the Supreme Court held that segregated public
schools were inherently unequal and overruled prior precedent
affirming the doctrine of separate but equal, the Court suggested that
compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education "demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."' Id. (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))).
137. Role of Civic Education, supra note 20, at 1; Thomas Lickona, Educating for
Character: A Comprehensive Approach, in The Construction of Children's Character
59 (Alex Molnar ed., 1997) (including among key ideas that "parents are a child's first
and most important moral teachers, and the school must do everything it can to
support parents in this role" and that "the impact of the school-parent partnership is
enhanced when the wider community... promotes the virtues that make up good
character").
138. Role of Civic Education, supra note 20, at 1.
139. Macedo, supra note 18, at 45-87.
140. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
141. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76-77 (1979)).
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education to our democratic society.1' 42 But the Brown Court also
stated:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 3
In subsequent cases, the Court has also spoken of the role of
schools in teaching "'the shared values of a civilized social order,"' '
identifying such values both as "'in themselves conducive to
happiness"' (or personal self-government) and "'indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation." ''
Current political rhetoric, which puts education at the top of the list of
national priorities, similarly regards education as vital not only to
democracy but also to success in life, so as to equip children with the
skills to be capable employees in the new economy, to be self-
sufficient, or to pursue professional education.
On one view, it may seem that schools, in trying to prepare children
for successful lives, are usurping the work of families and intruding
upon dimensions of personal development that should be left to
parents. The idea that schools, as a general matter, improperly usurp
parental authority if they try to prepare children not only for
citizenship but to live successful lives should be rejected. States have
broad authority, under the police power, to promote public health,
welfare, morals, and safety. As Brown observed, "[t]oday, education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."1" An examination of state laws that set out the aims of
public education confirms that it is assumed that public education
plays an important role both in preparing children for citizenship and
for success in life, in such realms as employment and higher education.
Recognizing the "constitutional dimension to the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children"'47 does not require interpreting
"primary" responsibility to mean "exclusive" responsibility. Families
are not the only sites for generating the capacities for self-
government, and government, through publicly-funded schools, has
the authority and responsibility to foster children's capacities for self-
government and create responsible, virtuous citizens. Thus, inverting
the Supreme Court rhetoric noted above, Macedo contends: "[t]he
142- Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683).
145. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic
History of the United States 228 (1968)).
146. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
147. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2069 (2000).
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justification for some measure of public authority lies in the fact that
children are not simply creatures of their parents, but are independent
persons with their own lives to lead."'148 He assumes a dual
sovereignty of parents and public schools, so that, "the child can
rightfully be subjected to parental or public efforts to inculcate their
visions of good character so long as these efforts are not repressive,
and so long as the child is also presented with information about
alternative ways of life." '149 The goal is that neither parents nor the
democratic community should "be allowed to confine children's
options within narrow limits, or deny any child the right to pursue his
or her own path in life. 150
The current interest in character education offers a good illustration
of how the mission of public schools pertains to preparing children
both for citizenship and for living good, successful lives and of the
dual authority of schools and families for fostering children's
capacities. Local, state, and national government, as well as various
non-governmental coalitions, all support character education as a way
in which schools can support and reinforce the efforts of parents, who
have the first and foremost obligation (along with other institutions of
civil society) to provide moral education for their children.' 51 To be
sure, some proponents argue that because families are failing in their
duty to provide moral education to their children, schools must step
into the breach and do so. An examination of the traits that such
education seeks to develop shows that many of those traits would be
relevant both to democratic life and to personal self-government.
Indeed, the motivation behind the movement for character education
suggests serious concern with helping children learn about and adopt
moral values that would guide them in their lives and thus countering
148. Macedo, supra note 18, at 243.
149. Id. at 237.
150. Id. Abner Greene has also expressed this idea of dual sources of authority as
consistent with his own view of our constitutional order as authorizing multiple
repositories of power. See Greene, supra note 80, at 490-91. In contrast, Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), allowed Amish parents to remove their children, once
they reached age 14, from compulsory public education and from any other formal
education. But it should be noted that the Court assumed that the Amish community
could successfully cultivate in its adolescents the virtues necessary to be both good
citizens and successful (i.e., self-sufficient) in life. See id. at 224-25.
151. See, e.g., William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President at Character
Education Conference (May 23, 1995) (transcript available on M2 Presswire on
lexis.com) (describing character education as "a supplement . ., not a replacement,"
for what parents do); William Jefferson Clinton, 1996 State of the Union Address at
U.S. Capitol, 2/15/96 Vital Speeches 258 (challenging "all ... schools to teach
character education, to teach good values and good citizenship"); Character Counts!
Coalition, http://www.charactercounts.org [hereinafter "Character Counts"]
("Character education is, first and foremost, an obligation of families and faith
communities, but schools and use-service organizations also have a responsibility to
help develop the character of young people."); Lickona, supra note 137, at 45, 59
("[Plarents are a child's first and most important moral teachers, and the school must
do everything it can to support parents in this role .... ).
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the absence of strong moral values perceived in mass entertainment.
Another powerful motivation for character education was the
shocking series of episodes of violence committed by students against
other students and teachers, and the prevalence of a sense of
hopelessness among children." These character education efforts
assume that there is a set of qualities that will serve students well both
in their lives and in their role as citizens: "[Tihe well-being of our
society requires an involved, caring citizenry with good moral
character. 153
Thus, in light of the current constitutional landscape and actual
practices, a more plausible division of labor is that families and
schools should play complementary roles in fostering both democratic
and personal self-government. Some scholars have suggested that
parents appropriately teach children what it means to follow a
particular way of life, while schools, a setting in which children of
diverse religious, ethnic, and racial origins learn together, teach
children about how to tolerate and respect different ways of life."
This model of complementarity can become more tense and vexed
when parental and school values conflict, such that it may seem, in
some instances, more appropriate to regard schools as serving a
compensatory or ameliorative role when instruction at home may
conflict with democratic values. Other scholars contend that because
"[p]arents may educate their children at home with a single moral
voice," and seek to ensure that their children adhere to the values,
beliefs, and way of life taught at home, they may be unsuited to
expose their children to diversity and to inculcate respect for
difference, and schools should play a compensatory role and "have a
plurality of moral voices."1 55  I will explore this dilemma more by
focusing on sex equality.
152. See Character Counts, supra note 151; Character Education in America (The
Commonwealth Foundation for Public Policy Alternatives, Mar. 1996).
153. Aspen Declaration on Character Education, in Character Counts, supra note
151. An Iowa statute, aimed at making schools safe, fostering academic excellence,
and at equipping students to be model citizens, lists the desirable character qualities
as:
honesty; responsibility; respect and care for the person and property of
others; self-discipline; understanding of, respect for, and obedience to law
and citizenship; courage, initiative, commitment, and perseverance;
kindness, compassion, service, and loyalty; fairness, moderation, and
patience; and the dignity and necessity of hard work.
Iowa Code Ann. § 256.18 (West 1996).
154. See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (1987).
155. Okin and Reich, supra note 110, at 295.
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B. Conflicts Between Parents and Schools Over the Domain
of Civic Virtue
1. The Capacity for Critical Reflection
If governmental institutions, such as schools, seek to inculcate forms
of civic virtue that families do not foster, what if such measures seem
to threaten families' ability to foster their own conceptions of virtue?
As has been well covered in the literature, the civic project of teaching
tolerance and awareness of and respect for different ways of life
threatens families that adhere to religious fundamentalism. 156  An
underlying issue in this controversy to which scholars have devoted
considerable attention is whether the capacity for critical reflection is
a core civic virtue necessary for democratic self-government, one that
common public schools should cultivate in children, and, if so, how
deeply it should reach into children's personal self-government.
While some scholars contend that cultivating that capacity would have
a salutary effect on children's capacities to be good citizens and to live
good (self-governing) lives, 57 others fear the "corrosive" effect of
such spillover. 158 My purpose here in revisiting that controversy is not
to offer a fresh resolution, but to make two points. First, the
controversy itself illuminates the problem of identifying the domain of
civic virtue and the problem of spillover from democratic to personal
self-government. That is, the curriculum to which fundamentalist
families object clearly has a civic purpose, but it also aims at fostering
children's personal self-government, to prepare them for success in
life. Two, although the scholarly literature has extensively covered
the case of fundamentalist families from the perspective of the
competing demands of respect for parental autonomy and religious
freedom, on the one hand, and the imperatives of democratic
education, on the other, it tends to neglect a vital dimension: the
extent to which the civic education, character education, and other
156. For a helpful discussion of the literature and of the famous case, Mozert v.
Hawkins, see Macedo, supra note 18, at 157-68.
157. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 154, at 50-52 ("Children will eventually need
the capacity for rational deliberation to make hard choices in situations where...
authorities do not supply clear or consistent guidance."); Macedo, supra note 18, at
233-40 ("The current system of public schooling aims to promote directly certain core
liberal civic values."); Suzanne Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 Chi. L. Rev. 131, 157, 172 (including "critical thinking" as a core
element of republican education for citizenship).
158. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 23, at 254 (arguing that "sociopolitical
institutions" should not encourage values that are "at odds with the deep beliefs of
many of its loyal citizens"); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 581, 609-11 (1993) (discussing the Mozert case and remarking that "the
specific interest [the plaintiffs] asserted most strongly was the parents' exclusive right
to control their children's upbringing").
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forms of education to which fundamentalist families object seek to
foster sex equality, an important civic virtue. Similarly, the literature
seldom discusses the problem of the clash between systems of family
governance and family values and the value of sex equality and what
compensatory or ameliorative role government may play in promoting
sex equality in the face of inequality at home.
For adherents to religious fundamentalism, the core liberal civic
virtue of critical reflection upon one's roles and commitments in light
of the demands of liberal principles would clash deeply wvith their
world view. If the aim of government's formative project is to foster
the capacities for democratic as well as personal self-government, then
at issue in the fundamentalist hypothetical is how to prepare the
children for free and equal citizenship and to help them live self-
governing lives.
This dilemma cannot be resolved solely by falling back on the
simple division of labor between parents and schools considered and
rejected above. For if a public school's proper mission is to foster
children's capacities to be good citizens and successful adults, then
there is no simple way to confine the school's appropriate mission to
"civic" virtue or even to democratic self-government. The most
famous case involving the clash between the values of fundamentalist
families and the imperatives of public education is Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education.159 The "character education" statute
adopted by the Tennessee legislature at issue in the case identified the
aim of such education as "to help each student develop positive values
and improve student conduct as students learn to act in harmony with
their positive values.., and learn to become good citizens in their
school, community and society. ' ' "w Religious fundamentalist parents
objected to a reading curriculum that conflicted at many points with
their Biblical literalism. Invoking the Supreme Court's affirmation
that public schools teach "fundamental values 'essential to a
democratic society,"' the circuit court concluded that the reading
material at issue promoted the important virtue of "civil tolerance," or
the idea that "in a pluralistic society we must 'live and let live."",'
It should not be denied that recognizing that civic component of the
character education effort at issue in Mozert v. Hawkins offers a
strong justification for the curriculum at issue. Some of the most
thoughtful literature about civic education and civic virtue clearly
suggests the importance of the capacity for critical reflection for
democratic self government: "[d]emocratic self-government means
citizen participation based on informed, critical reflection."'62 Thus,
159. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
160. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-1007 (1996).
161. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1068-69.
162. The Role of Civic Education, supra note 20, at 5 (quoting Benjamin Barber,
An Aristocracy of Everyone (1992) (emphasis added)); see also Macedo, supra note
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one prerequisite intellectual skill is critical thinking. 63 Therefore, it
seems that a strong case can be made that critical thinking is a basic
intellectual skill important to democratic self-government and that
fostering such thinking is a proper part of government's formative
project.
Yet more was at stake in the conflict over Tennessee's character
education program than civic virtues. As the concurring opinion
pointed out, the curriculum aimed to "prepare students for life in a
complex, pluralistic society."' 164  The spillover question seems
unavoidable. The fear many liberals express is that of children
instructed in their parents' way of life and not exposed, through public
education, to any idea of alternative possibilities or of any role for
independent judgment about how to live their own lives, as they
mature.165 As Macedo puts it: "Insulating children from diversity is
less serious than keeping them from needed medicine, but awareness
of alternative ways of life is a prerequisite not only of citizenship...
but also of being able to make the most basic life choices."'" Here,
the appeal is clearly made that such education is needed for good
citizenship, to foster virtues such as respect for the rights of others,
toleration of reasonable pluralism, and mutual respect, and for a good
life, to help children make "informed and independent decisions"
about how they want to live their lives. 67 Other liberals (famously
Galston) defend a right to live an unexamined life and reject the idea
that liberalism's legitimate civic purposes extend to developing in
children critical ("corrosive") reflection on ways of life to facilitate
(what Amy Gutmann calls) "conscious social reproduction.""6 And
other theorists argue that it is not without justification that
fundamentalist parents perceive that teaching fundamentalist children
the liberal ideal of respect for diversity directly threatens the survival
of their culture. 69 In a fresh approach to this familiar dilemma, Emily
Buss turns to the literature on identity development to argue that, if
parents are denied a right to opt out of curriculum, they will remove
18, at 231-40 ("Children must at the very least be provided with the intellectual tools
necessary to understand the world around them, formulate their own convictions and
make their own way in life."); Gutmann, supra note 154, at 39-47 ("[E]ducation
[should not be used] to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the
good life and the good society.").
163. Macedo, supra note 18, at 239-40; The Role of Civic Education, supra note 20,
at 5.
164. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 18, at 240 (learning about "the ethnic, racial, and
religious diversity that constitutes our society" is to help children think as citizens and
"not live in a mental straitjacket at odds with freedom").
166. Id. at 202.
167. Id. at 207,232 (emphasis omitted).
168. Galston, supra note 23, at 254. On the ideal of "conscious social
reproduction" as an aim of democratic education, see Gutmann, supra note 154, at 39.
For a recent, critical evaluation of this ideal, see Salomone, supra note 50, at 197-215.
169. See Stolzenberg, supra note 158, at 611-33.
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their children from common public schools, denying children valuable
exposure to ideologically diverse peers that facilitates reflective
identity formation rather than unquestioning adherence to parental
and religious norms about identity.170 But this interesting appeal to
the literature on identity formation makes it quite clear that the
concern over the reach of education applies to personal self-
government, in the broadest sense, and not solely to democratic self-
government. 7
1
2. The Missing Dimension of Sex Equality
The extensive literature about conflicts between school curriculum
and family imperatives tends to neglect the important issue of how
schools may promote the virtue of sex equality." To be sure, the civic
virtues of the capacity for critical refection and of tolerance for
diverse ways of life are very important for elaborating the content and
domain of sex equality and to inculcating sex equality. Those
capacities, if developed in children, might help to allow them to
question the constraining effects of gender role expectations and of
world view. The capacity for critical reflection is part of the familiar
liberal idea of revisability, that persons can assess their commitments
and connections and revise them. This liberal principle holds promise
for fostering women's capacity for self-government. Cultivating the
capacity for critical self-reflection might counter socialization into
narrowly prescribed gender roles.
Moreover, the capacity for critical refection, at least on some
accounts, also enables persons to reflect on current institutional
170. Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control
Between Parent and State, 67 U. Chi. L Rev. 1233 (2000).
171. Indeed, my own look at the literature of identity formation suggests that
Macedo's civic liberalism would be quite concerned that children not follow the path
of identity foreclosures, or those who made identity commitments without a period of
exploring, foreclosing possibility by bringing along unquestioned childhood
ascriptions. For such adolescents, little or no value attaches to cultivating the capacity
for critical reflection; the goal is to preserve tradition, not to question family
attachments and religious beliefs. By contrast, those theorists who believe that
critical self-reflection should be a core civic virtue that will spill over into all of life
would likely wish adolescents to follow the path of identity achievement, that is, those
who made identity commitments after a period of exploration, perhaps following a
period of moratorium, in which they were in a period of crisis or exploration in an
effort to discover the values or goals that fit them. For these categories, see Ruthellen
Josselson, The Theory of Identity Development and the Question of Intervention, in
Interventions for Adolescent Identity Development 12, 17-18 (Sally L Archer ed.,
1994) (using categories defined by James Marcia, based on Eric Erickson's work).
172. Some accounts that do discuss the issue include Gutmann, supra note 154, at
12-13, 113-15; Salomone, supra note 50, at 234-36. In this article, I am confining my
discussion to the role of common public schools. I leave for elaboration elsewhere
both a consideration of the question of vouchers for private schools and a
consideration of how and to what extent private schools (including religious schools)
should carry out the type of civic education I recommend here.
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arrangements and to perceive gaps between ideals and practices. And
here, for example, accounts of civic virtue that stress deference to
authority or a general obedience and acceptance of legitimacy blunt
the force of this dissident citizenship. Indeed, the story of the
emergence of sex equality, as I argued in Part II, includes this history
of dissident citizenship and reconstruction of national commitments to
liberty and equality. But this capacity for reflection is not helpful
without something to reflect upon-principles of anti-subordination
and of free and equal citizenship. It is here that many accounts of
civic virtue tend to fall short. It would be better to talk more
forthrightly about sex equality and anti-subordination based on sex as
a core component of civic virtue and political morality with relevance
to democratic and personal self-government.
Part of what fundamentalist parents objected to in Mozert v.
Hawkins was a curriculum that seemed to promote feminism and that
challenged traditional gender roles by supposedly teaching "role
reversal or role elimination, particularly biographical material about
women who have been recognized for achievements outside their
homes."'73 And yet government's interest in promoting sex equality
played no role in the court's analysis of the justifications for the
curriculum. It is especially important, given that principles of
toleration and associational liberty should preclude government from
compelling families to eschew certain traditional gender roles, that
schools be able to use curriculum to model sex equality to boys and
girls in ways that might "eliminate differences in their basic liberties
and opportunities."174
My approach to how government's formative project should foster
sex equality would be to examine places in the existing mission of
schools in which that virtue should be featured. To offer a
preliminary account, which I leave for elaboration elsewhere, this
could include civic education, character education, family life and
health education, and sex education.175
173. Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1987).
174. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 63-67
(1996) (defending reading exercise at issue in Mozert picturing a boy cooking while a
girl reads to him).
175. If schools properly seek to foster children's capacities for personal self-
government, as part of their mission of fostering success in life, then this raises
difficult empirical and normative questions about when "interventions for identity,"
i.e., ways in which governmental actors may seek to encourage optimal paths of
development, may be appropriate. See generally Archer, An Overview, in
Interventions for Adolescent Identity Development 3, 10 (Sally L. Archer ed., 1994)
(calling for "continued development of interventions that could enrich" adolescent
identity development). Some scholars on identity development, for example, argue
that if certain paths of identity development allow an individual to make his or her
way in the world more effectively, then such interventions are justified. Schools
might, for example, consider how to help children negotiate difficult tasks of identity
development when their home environments are not optimally suited to support such
1662 [Vol. 69
2001] FAMILIES, SCHOOLS AND SEX EQUALITY
Civic education should properly include fostering literacy about sex
equality. As discussed in Part II, such education would include
relevant federal constitutional law and civil rights statutes, as well as
the history of dissident citizenship that took the form of abolitionism,
early and second wave feminism, and the civil rights movement. 76
Given that equality is considered among the core national
commitments and among the "values and principles basic to American
constitutional democracy" in prominent accounts of the aims of civic
education,177 incorporating a more robust focus on sex equality would
entail building on an existing framework. The lesson of women's
exclusion from full citizenship and their gradual inclusion should be
part of education about those "'fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system.""' 8  The federal
government would have an appropriate role in encouraging states to
develop curriculum. States and localities also would be important
sources of "core" values and norms about equality."7 Undeniably,
there are conflicts over the appropriate meaning and scope of such
tasks. Here, schools are engaging in a sort of intervention on behalf of fostering
children's well-being, but one that doesn't directly regulate or intrude upon the
family, and yet seeks to influence or, in some sense, have an effect on family
dynamics. There are also many ways in which schools, through curriculum, can
reinforce or even enhance families' roles in fostering children's capacities. Such
curriculum could also seek to ameliorate the effects when families fail to offer an
optimal environment for fostering children's capacities. This type of curriculum,
generally, seems to be a promising and salutary way to carry out government's
formative project. It also would find justification under the states' police power. If,
as I argue, we should take seriously the idea that families properly serve an important
institutional role of fostering children's capacities, then we should also think about the
optimal circumstances within which families can do so. Of course, there are many
prudential reasons for concern over state interventions, as well as constitutional
restraints.
176. By contrast, even though women's reproductive rights are part of our
constitutional norms of liberty and equality, Salomone would not include them in the
common national core; because abortion is controversial and contested, education
about it is a matter on which parents should exercise choice concerning curriculum
and school. Salomone, supra note 50, at 228-66.
177. The Role of Civic Education, supra note 20.
178. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76-77 (1979)).
179. A more explicit focus upon sex equality might help to strengthen the type of
"civic education" about basic rights and liberties that political liberalism seeks to give
even to children whose parents wish to withdraw them from the world. Rawls,
Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 199-200. For example, Okin grants that such
"civic education" "could be helpful in partially resolving the conflict between
religious toleration and gender equality" because it "could to some extent counteract
the isolation some religious groups now succeed in maintaining for their children."
Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, supra note 103, at 32. But she is
dubious whether this would suffice "to enable children whose primary environment
taught them basic inequalities to question these inequalities deeply and successfully."
Id. If the children live in a culture that reinforces these unequal social roles, then how
will children develop the capacity to question those social roles? Okin,
Multiculturalism, supra note 103, at 22.
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norms as equality, and thus "teach[ing] the conflicts" is an important
component of such education.'10
There would also be components of a formative project that are
more properly of local concern and responsibility. For example, I
believe that gender education, aimed at helping students recognize
how sex role stereotypes shape ideas of womanhood and manhood
and thus avoid the harms to self-government that such stereotyping
causes (such as notions of male entitlement and female subservience),
should be incorporated throughout the school curriculum. 8' Schools
should consider how to promote sex equality and foster gender
education within such existing curricular offerings as courses as family
life, health, and sex education.
Character education programs could be a promising framework
within which to promote sex equality and to foster gender education,
since they aim at teaching core values. At present, the literature on
character education seems insufficiently attentive to sex equality and
problems of constraining gender roles. Nonetheless, the values
embraced in such programs, such as respect for others, justice,
fairness, responsibility, caring, and civic virtue and citizenship, have
obvious potential for incorporating a more explicit concern for sex
equality."8 However, there is a tension in the literature on character
education over whether its real aim is adherence to traditional values
and uncritical deference to authority or encouragement of the sorts of
moral capacities that allow for independent thought and critical
reflection on traditional order."8  If the former, it could leave
problems of sex inequality and traditional gender roles unchallenged.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have explored several puzzles about the domain of
civic virtue. On the one hand, it seems that the proper domain of civic
virtue pertains to democratic self-government, but, on the other,
leading accounts of civic virtue suggest an unavoidable spillover from
fostering virtues important to democratic life to fostering virtues
180. Massaro, supra note 51, at 140-52.
181. For an interesting example of such gender education, see Karen Greenlaw
Bieri & Mindy Bingham, A Working Curriculum for Gender Roles, in Interventions
for Adolescent Identity Development 141 (Sally L. Archer ed., 1994).
182. See Aspen Declaration on Character Education, in Character Counts, supra
note 151 (listing core ethical values as: "respect, responsibility, trustworthiness, justice
and fairness, caring, and civic virtue and citizenship").
183. For an introduction to this debate, see Alfie Kohn, The Trouble With
Character Education, in The Construction of Children's Character 154 (Alex Molnar
ed., 1997) (contending that character education aims at uncritical deference to
authority rather than the better goal of fostering children's autonomy and ethical
development); Charles S. White, The Moral Dimension of Civic Education in the
Elementary School: Habit or Reason?, 179 J. Educ. 35 (1997) (summarizing the debate
and urging a middle way, attentive to both approaches).
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important to personal self-government, and vice versa. This problem
of spillover, I have suggested, animates some of the most difficult
problems concerning a second puzzle: the respective division of labor
between institutions of government and of civil society in carrying out
a formative project to foster democratic and personal self-
government. A simple division of labor is elusive, as I have illustrated
by examining constitutional jurisprudence-and contemporary social
understandings-concerning the roles of families and schools in
cultivating civic virtue. It is commonly claimed that families are, or
should be, "seedbeds" of civic virtue. I have argued that, in a good
society, families will play a role not only in cultivating civic virtue, but
also in fostering other forms of virtue and contributing vitally to
personal self-government. But they also are "'seedbeds" in a much
more foundational way: they provide necessary caregiving that
nurtures human development and fosters human capital. Similarly, in
a good society, schools properly aim to foster children's capacities for
democratic and personal self-government by preparing them for good
citizenship and for good, successful lives.
In this article, I have also explored the domain of sex equality. I
have argued that sex equality should be a core element in a
conception of civic virtue in a good society, yet it receives insufficient
attention in accounts of civic virtue. The content of this virtue of sex
equality may be gleaned from federal constitutional and statutory
norms, state and local anti-discrimination law, transformations in the
law of domestic relations, contemporary principles of political
morality, and (to some extent) shared cultural consensus. Sex
equality, I contend, is not only a civic virtue-one that should guide
how government treats female and male citizens and how citizens
treat and regard each other-but also is (or should be) a virtue of
every day life, a principle of political morality that should inform and
regulate forms of personal self-government. Taking up the familiar
feminist criticism of sex inequality within families, I have examined
the puzzle of how families may serve as seedbeds of civic virtue if sex
inequality exists within them. I have highlighted this problem by
looking both at the fundamentalist family, and at the garden variety
gendered division of household labor in many families. The difficult
problem of "congruence" raises the issue of just how deeply that
virtue should reach to structure everyday life and how competing
political principles, constitutional rights, and prudential concerns may
temper that reach.
I have offered a somewhat contradictory set of responses to this
puzzle of congruence. First, I have taken issue with certain accounts
of civic virtue that would imply that the matter of sex inequality
within families is off limits because it is simply too contested by
countering that, to a significant degree, norms of sex equality already
shape family life and rule out the legally sanctioned, patriarchal family
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of an earlier era. Thus, a simple schematic that would relegate sex
equality to public life and exempt private life does not hold. Second, I
have acknowledged that, even though sex equality is a core
constitutional and public value, this value and its proper application
are controversial, especially as it pertains to family self-governance
and the socialization of children. I have suggested that there are
significant constitutional principles and prudential considerations,
such as a respect for pluralism and the value of civil society serving as
a buffer against the state, that argue against government compelling
families to organize themselves according to one uniform vision of
what sex equality requires. At the same time, this does not rule out
government carrying out a formative project to promote sex equality
by a range of measures that fall short of coercion. Such forms of
governmental action could encourage sex equality within families and
also inculcate in children norms of sex equality in sites outside of the
family. Schools, for example, may do this through civic education,
character education, gender education, and through other curricula.
Fostering sex equality is one important component of schools' proper
formative project of fostering children's capacities for democratic and
personal self-government.
Just as educating children for diversity by teaching them about
different ways of life may help to foster civic virtue as well as personal
self-government, so teaching about sex equality may help to counter
messages learned in families and in other institutions of civil society.
Inculcating sexism in children may not be as harmful as refusing them
needed medication, but government has an appropriate interest in
helping children develop their capacities free from the constraining
force of sex-role stereotypes and of the legacy of male domination and
female submission.
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